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Deregulation of electric power industries in recent years has opened many 
opportunities for electricity buyers. However, the strong influence of network 
physical constraints may result in economic decisions that adversely affect the 
interests of the consumers. Compared to the monopolistic economy of yesteryears, 
electricity buyers may now actually be able to influence the market by cooperating 
with other buyers in the electrical power network. This research presents different 
models using agent-based co-evolutionary framework for evolving individual and 
cooperative strategies of electricity buyers in a power market.  
To realize the above objectives, simulations involving evolutionary 
algorithms and multi-agent systems are used to study a single-node system, where 
economic agents are modeled by their supply / demand functions, and then a 
multi-node system, where the technical constraints of the power distribution 
network are fully taken into account. The results of the single-node model show 
that it is of great benefit to cooperate but the free rider problem may arise when an 
individual buyer gains more profit due to the cooperative effort of the others.  
The multi-node model is investigated through two situations. First, we 
focus on deterministic cases where buyers choose their bidding strategies to 
maximize the profits in different scenarios of playing individually or 
cooperatively. It is also found that by evolutionary learning, buyers can benefit 
from cooperation. Next, the uncertain nature of the market is modeled where 
buyers find optimal cooperation strategies to hedge against the risk of low 
ix 
 
payoffs. Our approach is universal since it can be applied to study the behaviors of 
buyers with any objective for cooperation. We proved a theorem to link the payoff 
distribution problem in cooperative game theory with the optimal coalition 
structure generation problem in combinatorial optimization theory. The 
statistically consistent simulation results show that our approach is able to 
discover interesting cooperation strategies, and can be easily extended for 
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In this chapter, we give a brief review on deregulated electricity market. Then the 
motivation for the work done and structure of the thesis are presented. 
 
1.1 Overview of the deregulated power market 
Over the last twenty years, electric power markets have successively experienced 
a deregulation process related to the opening of gas and electricity industry. 
Competition, expected to push operators to high efficiency, is presented as the 
most effective response to the imperfections of the old regulated power industry. 
Initially implemented by Anglo-Saxon countries, the deregulation of power 
markets has been gradually taken up by all industrialized countries. By the 
principle that competition should be introduced whenever possible, this reform 
has to major implications on the decision of firms initially protected from 
competition. Moreover, electricity buyer agents also have new opportunities to 
actively optimize their objectives in a dynamically changing environment.  
 
1.1.1 Electricity and natural monopoly 
Electricity is an essential commodity in modern life; the interruption of the 
electricity supply implies a considerable social cost. Electricity is not storable by 
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its users; the demand, therefore, must be satisfied in real time. The consumption of 
electricity is subject to strong randomness which is a function of exogenous 
factors such as temperature or brightness.  
Electricity is transported via high voltage interconnected 
lines. Transmission and distribution (low voltage) follow nodal rule and mesh rule 
of Kirchhoff. The lack of storage implies that we must have permanent means of 
reserve to manage the difference between the predicted quantity and the actually 
produced and consumed quantity. Transmission is also subject to line loss (part of 
the electrical power is converted into heat due to Joule effect). If the line 
temperature exceeds a certain threshold, it will give rise to the rupture of the 
line. The cost of failure is outrageous as other lines can also collapse in cascade. 
These features illustrate that the systems must be designed according to the peak 
demand, with some margin to ensure continuity of supply in case of technical 
problems. 
The electric power industry consists of three major components: central 
power generation, high voltage transmission and distribution networks. We can 
therefore recognize the importance of coordination between the various activities 
related vertically, both in long-term system configuration, and short-term efficient 
allocation of resources. If we add the economies of scale in production and 
increasing returns on transportation, electricity markets appear as natural 
monopolies and vertical integration can significantly reduce transaction costs. 
This explains why electricity markets have been managed by national or regional 
monopolies (at least on transportation) in all countries, often vertically integrated, 
or characterized by close ties between vertically related actors. These companies 
were often public, particularly because electricity has become a vital product 
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carrying public service missions. The involvement of the state had also facilitated 
the mobilization of main material resources that are necessary for the rapid 
construction of dense and high performance networks. 
 
1.1.2 Movement to a new competitive market 
The motivation of movement to competition is driven by a number of criticisms 
against monopolies in place: inefficiency of production and social debate over 
surplus sharing. In developing countries, bureaucratic criticism is often used to 
justify the open to competition and privatization of the electricity industry. 
Competition, expected to push operators to efficiency, is presented as the most 
effective response to these imperfections. Thus, allowing consumers to choose 
their suppliers should guide the latter to better use of resources, reducing waste, 
improving services or even greater respect for the environment.  
The deregulation process has transformed the power market into a 
competitive environment; firms must therefore change their strategy and 
organization deeply to adapt. In this free market economy, each participant seeks 
for the optimal strategy that maximizes its benefit when trading. 
The main sectors of power generation, distribution, wholesale and retail 
have seen an increase in the number of players, who are now able to freely enter 
and exit the market to seek out economic opportunities. In most countries that 
have seen the deregulation in power sector, the competitive nature of the new 
economy has aided the technological push in this area. Coupled with the market 
forces at work, this has generally led to lower costs and greater market reliability, 
which has benefited the industry, especially the end users. The result is a market 
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of stiff competition in which the price and the electricity power traded is decided 
by the market forces, and where all players are price takers and have to accept the 
market clearing price (MCP) as dictated by the market. New rules and regulations 
have been set into place by supervisory bodies to regulate possible technical 
problems such as system blackouts and transmission security, as well as economic 
decisions such as curbing possible market power to restrict the ability to set 
unreasonably high price. Therefore, electricity buyers and sellers have to 
reconsider their bidding strategies and economic approaches to tackle the changed 
environment.   
 
1.1.3 Deregulated power market models 
The management of the daily operations and ensuring network security are tasked 
to two independent bodies: the power exchange and the independent system 
operator. The former determines the market clearing price and market clearing 
quantity (MCQ) based on the demand and supply bids it receives from the electric 
power buyers and sellers respectively. The latter monitors and checks the dispatch 
forecasts to ensure that the security of the system has not been compromised, and 
advices the power exchange on preventive measures.  
Following the restructuring of electricity market, different market models 
have been proposed to replace the vertically integrated monopoly. There are three 
basic types of deregulated power market models: PoolCo model, the bilateral 
contracts model and the hybrid model [1].   
A PoolCo is viewed as a centralized marketplace that clears the market for 
buyers and sellers using a set of rules for trading electricity. Producers submit 
5 
 
their bids for different periods, usually for each hour. Every offer of power 
quantity is accompanied by a corresponding price representing the minimum level 
that each producer is willing to accept for each period. The pool centralizes all 
offers and defines an order of economic efficiency. The last accepted bid that is 
necessary to cover the level of demand defines the spot price. Sellers compete for 
selling electricity; if a seller bids too high, it may not be able to sell. On the other 
hand, buyers compete for buying power, and if their bids are too low, they may 
not be able to purchase. 
In the bilateral contracts model, the supplier and the customer trade 
directly with each other by signing a contract that defines the kind of service they 
desire at the price they desire. However, in power market, this model has some 
drawbacks: Because of its failure to be stored, electricity is extremely price 
volatile in times of peak demands; hence the market has difficulty in reaching the 
equilibrium. Moreover, due to the sharing of common transmission network, the 
transmission losses caused by the action of one participant can affect all others. 
Because of these negative points, the simulation and analysis of power market 
often make use of the PoolCo model.  
The hybrid model combines features of two previous models. The 
participants can choose to sign bilateral contracts or to be served by the power 
pool. Under this mechanism, true customer choice is offered and a variety of 
services and pricing options to best meet individual customer needs is created. 
 
1.2 Motivation of the research 
The   deregulation  of  the  electricity power  industry  has  already  been  
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accomplished  in  many  countries and remarkable changes in the management of 
power systems are introduced. A new environment  for  the  market participants 
was created  since  the  electricity  price  is  now  set  by  an  auction  mechanism. 
In the global competitive market, electricity buyers are no longer price 
taker since they are able to influence the market by using different bidding 
strategies as well as cooperating with other buyers. Therefore it is necessary to 
develop and investigate individual and cooperative strategies of electricity buyers. 
That is the inspiration and motivation of this project.  
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized in 9 chapters.  
Chapter 1 gives an overview on the deregulated power market and the motivation 
of the research. 
In Chapter 2, we give a literature review of different approaches to model power 
market, with highlights on applying Evolutionary Algorithms in a Multi-Agent 
framework. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology of the research and gives a brief background 
on computational tools that will be applied such as Evolutionary / Co-evolutionary 
Algorithms and Cooperative Game.  
In Chapter 4, we propose a single-node model for simulating power market with 
generators and buyers as two types of participants. The bidding model and market 
clearing mechanism are also presented. 
Chapter 5 presents the simulation results of the proposed single-node model. 
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Different scenarios of the market are taken into account and economic aspects of 
the results are investigated. 
Chapter 6 develops a multi-node model of the power market where all physical 
constraints are taken into account. The Optimal Power Flow problem is introduced 
as a market clearing engine. 
Chapter 7 presents the details of the multi-node model implementation, such as 
the physical power network and market participants’ parameters.   
Chapter 8 summarizes the simulation results of the multi-node model and 
discusses the findings with different perspectives. 



















The electricity market is characterized by complex practical aspects, such as 
imperfect competition, strategic interaction, asymmetric information, and the 
possibility of multiple equilibria [2]. Traditional economic modeling techniques 
face difficulties when taking into account these factors. Therefore, Computational 
Intelligence is intensively applied to economy, especially economic theories. 
Recent advances in this field have allowed simulating artificial societies and thus 
studying economic models by running computer simulations. The concept of 
“Agent” in computer science is close to that of economic theories [3].  Under a 
Computational Intelligence framework, the interactions between intelligent agents 
can be observed and analyzed.  With these efficient modeling and simulation 
tools, researchers are able to investigate economic theories in a complementary 
framework to the standard analysis.  
 
2.1 Background of Agent Based Technology 
From the last decade, information technology growths with an amazing speed. 
Today, transmission / processing capabilities and networked information resource 
storage actively interact in the distributed computing paradigm [4] to serve its 
needs. The current  trend  in  software  engineering  methodology  to  build  
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software system  is  the object  oriented  methodology.  With the ability to 
structure data based  on inheritance  and  composition  structures,  the ability to 
account for the generic characteristic of behaviors or concepts, the reusability  
property  of  objects,  object  oriented  methodology become very attractive for 
software implementation. 
In real world, both  the  computer  system  and  the  problems  to  be  
solved are  also  often  physically  distributed  over  a  wide  area;  therefore a  
large  number  of  experts  in different domains is required, coordinating their 
knowledge and their local view of the problem to reach a global solution.  Multi-
agent technology can be considered as an extension of the object oriented 
technology, accounting for the distributed nature of systems and problems. 
MAS allows artificially reproducing real life system through autonomous, 
independent and interacting agent objects. Examples of successful application of 
MAS to many fields include traffic control simulation, robotics, ecological 
simulations, videogames…In  particular,  MAS  makes  it  possible  to  study  
individual behaviors and to link them to observations at the macro level, thus 
allow  having  a  new  insight  in  the  field. Indeed, since most collective 
phenomena result from individual decisions, there is a need to account for 
phenomena emerging from interaction of individual behaviors.  
Agent technology is also commonly used to assist or replace humans in 
numerous complex tasks. The need for effective  and  quick  decision  taking 
procedures  in  the  increasing  global  competition  involves  the  support  of  
intelligent systems. Agent-based technologies and international standards 
developed [5] have taken great steps over the years. The new agent-based 
approach using object-oriented frameworks [6] and agent-oriented programming 
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paradigms is far more superior to classical methods in modeling autonomous 
nature and decision making of market participants. 
Multi Agent Systems (MAS) is one of the fastest growing and most 
interesting fields in agent based technology that models autonomous decision 
making entities. Recently, encouraging results was produced in a novel approach 
to duel with multi-player interactive systems [7].  
 
2.2 Multi-Agents in economics 
Traditional analytical methods typically have to impose strong and constraining 
assumptions on the agents of system being studied, so that the models can be 
tracked mathematically. Therefore, the agent based approach is suitable for 
simulating and validating the decision making process of various participants in 
deregulated electricity market. Each agent represents an autonomous participant 
with independent bidding strategies and responses to market outcomes. 
As we saw in the previous section, MAS used in economics is a very 
particular framework of a fully decentralized economy. The study about this type 
of economic models comes from the desire of some economists to get out of the 
standard analytical framework that describes a centralized economy and ignores 
the interactions between agents. This conventional model functions following the 
simplifications that do not allow apprehending a number of phenomena, including 
those rising from the cooperation among agents. The development of MAS 
follows the development of new economic reflection with game theory as a main 
tool. Multi-agent simulation is a powerful approach. Indeed, agents are more 
realistic because they take into account more parameters. 
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The advantage of using MAS is the ability to show how the collective 
phenomena arise from the interaction and adaptation of a population of 
autonomous and heterogeneous agents. These models based on agents are also 
used as supporting decision tool for firms. These models allow the testing of 
several market configurations and studying the consequences of individual actions 
of market participants. 
Cooperation and trust between agents, with trust and profit as the 
determinants of the relationship was investigated using agent-based computational 
economics in [8]. Similarly, in [9], the agents cooperate with the condition that 
there is not a reduction in their own benefits. 
In [10], it was shown that the joint effort of all rational individuals 
involved in the economic activities will lead to equilibrium through a sequence of 
events. The analogy can be applied for a multi agent system, where the concept of 
rationality can be imbedded into the agents through certain sets of instructions. 
The agents follow these rules and further develop this rationality by applying 
penalties or benefits to their actions during their learning process. 
It was indicated in [11] that classical economics and computational 
intelligence are dissimilar because the former is based on mathematical analysis 
with related simplifications; while the latter is inspired from natural principles and 
deriving its conclusions by simulating real-world data. Nevertheless, these two 
approaches are complementary to each other because a convergence in 
computational intelligence algorithms is equivalent to equilibrium in economics.  




2.3 Multi-Agents in power systems 
Particularly, the multi-agent system (MAS) approach is suitable for simulating 
and validating the participation of various participants in deregulated energy 
market. Individual entities in the market are represented as agents. Each agent 
models an autonomous participant with independent bidding strategies and 
responses to market outcomes. Agents are able to function autonomously and 
interact actively with their environment. These specific characteristics of agents 
can be best employed in simulation of autonomous entities as in the situation of 
the restructured energy market. The administration role of Independent System 
Operator (ISO) in the restructured energy market can also be considered by an 
agent entity with decision making policies and market rules to manage efficiently 
the allocation and dispatch of energy resources on the network. This section gives 
an overview on the modeling and simulation of energy market and subsequently 
the application of this thesis using agent based technology.  
Multi-agents have been widely applied in power systems. We can find an 
example of real-world agent representation of power market in [12]. A multi-agent 
framework was used to realize switching operations of a power system in [13] by 
considering protective equipment and transmission as agents. A similar multi-
agent approach to coordinate secondary voltage control during system 
contingencies and to create an adaptive over current protection was presented in 
[14] and [15] respectively.  
In [16] was developed an efficient real time power management system 
using various types of agents to represent the elements of the network. In [17], the 
competition among intelligent agents was modeled with the goal of obtaining the 
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quantity of power desired by looking for the optimal electricity energy path.  
Chazelas [18] designed a multi-agent electricity market simulator and developed 
an evolutionary algorithm to solve for unit commitment and dispatch in real-time. 
 
2.4 Power market modeling using Evolutionary Algorithms in 
Agent-based framework 
Intelligent agents possess the capability to learn and evolve from experience; 
therefore evolutionary algorithms are frequently integrated to model competitive 
market. In [19], Curzon showed that Genetics Algorithms (GAs) have a high 
performance in simulating simple standard games. The author also interpreted 
how GA process discovers the equilibria.  
In [20], a refined genetic algorithm was employed to get greatest benefit 
supplier by finding optimal parameters of linear supply functions. In [21], Richter 
and Sheblé verified the evolution of bidding strategies of generation companies 
against the static strategy of a distribution company, without taking into account 
the transmission constraints.  In [22], the optimal selling price for generators was 
found while taking into account diverse issues such as tariffs, pricing strategy, 
discount scheme and the elasticity of customer demand. 
In [23], Fuji et al. considered a learning multi-agent model to assess 
different types of generator plants while taking into account real time reserve 
markets as well as the fluctuation of seasonal and hourly demand. Contreras et al. 
implemented a simulator for power exchange market in [24] which may be 




In [25] a Cooperative Co-evolutionary Algorithm was presented, 
emphasizing on its potential applications to power systems. Cau and Anderson 
described in [26] another co-evolutionary approach where the agents learn and 
improve their strategies. Anderson described in [27] another co-evolutionary 
approach where the agents learn and improve their strategies. They showed that 
implicit collusion happened even with very limited information available to 
participants.  Chen et al. [28] analyzed supply function equilibrium models of an 
oligopolistic power market by considering both linear and piece-wise linear 
supply functions. The results show a robust convergence towards the equilibrium. 
Adaptive agent based algorithms have also been applied to find equilibria of 
complex double auction game in a discriminatory pricing electricity market [29]. 
It was underlined in [30] that a combination of a multi-agent system and 
an evolutionary algorithm cannot permit the agents to adapt efficiently due to the 
limitations of the evolutionary algorithm which is set as the external layer. 
Alternatively, each sub-population or agent should be modeled more similarly to 
real-world agents who can evolve on their own. The multi-agent system 
framework should concentrate on providing an environment for the agents to 
interact. This is the inspiration of the Co-evolutionary Algorithm that will be 
discussed further.  
Although the number of buyers is significantly more than the number of 
sellers, most of the researches have been concentrating on the supply side. In a 
competitive market, the agents of both supply side and demand side continuously 
adapt their strategy according to their objectives. An Agent Based Evolutionary 
Model can therefore model the double bid auction market. The optimal bidding 
strategies for generators and large consumers in competitive market was studied in 
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[31] using the Monte Carlo approach.  
Srinivasan et al. [32] focused on minimizing the LMP of buyers using 
different evolutionary algorithms. In [33], the result was improved by adding a 
game theoretic decision module. The alliance strategy of buyers was studied in 
[34] and it was shown that the buyers can lower their costs by evolving their 
group sizes and memberships.  
 
2.5 Cooperative Game and Optimal Coalition  
Game theory provides important concepts and methods when studying the 
interaction of different agents in competitive markets. In particularly, cooperative 
game theory provides tools to solve the conflicts arising in the interaction, such as 
in allocating of transmission costs [35]. The solution mechanisms of this approach 
appreciate fairness, efficiency, and stability in distribution the payoffs among 
agents. Besides, extensive efforts have been devoted to the area of coalition 
formation. One direction of research is to partition the agents into coalitions such 
that the sum of payoffs to all the coalitions is maximized. This is the problem of 
Optimal Coalition Structure Generation (OCSG).  
There are two main classes of available algorithms that have been 
designed for OCSG problem: exact algorithms use integer programming or 
dynamic programming, and non-exact algorithms use heuristic or genetic 
algorithms. In [36], a dynamic programming (DP) that can be directly applied to 
the OCSG problem with the complexity of (3 )nO  was developed. This complexity 
is significant less than exhaustive enumeration that runs in ( )nO n time (n is the 
number of agents). Later, the authors in [37] developed an Improved Dynamic 
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Programming (IDP) algorithm that requires fewer operations and less memory 
than DP. However, both DP and IDP are not anytime algorithms, meaning they 
cannot be interrupted at any time to observe the best solution found so far. Given 
large numbers of agents, this property is a major drawback because agents, usually 
being limited in time, wouldn’t be able to wait until the end of the execution of the 
algorithm. To overcome this weakness, the first anytime algorithm for coalition 
structure generation was introduced in [38] by producing solutions within a finite 
bound from the optimal, and was further improved in [39]. More recently, the 
OCSG problem was formulated as a mixed integer programming problem and can 
be solved efficiently in [40].  
Non-exact algorithms do not guarantee finding an optimal solution, but 
they simply offer “good” solutions very quickly, compared to other algorithms. 
Given larger numbers of agents in this problem, this feature often makes these 
algorithms more practical. In [41], the authors have proposed an Order Based 
Genetic Algorithm for optimal coalition structures; the results showed that it 
surpasses existing deterministic algorithms. Both coalition structure generation 
and payoff distribution in competitive environments were addressed in [42, 43], 
where a bound from the optimal can be guaranteed if a kernel-stability is met [43]. 
More recent research has also modeled dynamic environments, where there are 
uncertainties; for example the coalition value is not ﬁxed, but it is dependent on 
context [44]. 
 
2.6 Chapter conclusions  
This chapter discusses different approaches to model deregulated power. In 
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particular, agent-based technology and cooperative game concepts have been 
highlighted. The overview introduced in this chapter form the grounding for a 
good and accurate understanding and modeling of the deregulated power market 
in the later chapters in which two different market simulator frameworks will be 
developed. Bidding and cooperation strategies of buyers will be implemented and 

















Chapter 3: PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR 




In the global competitive market, electricity buyers are no longer price takers 
since they are able to influence the market by using different bidding strategies as 
well as cooperating with other buyers. Therefore it is necessary to develop and 
investigate individual and cooperative strategies of electricity buyers. However, as 
mentioned above, most of the research efforts have been targeted at power 
generation and transmission; whereas research in demand side has not been 
sufficiently forthcoming. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, OCSG problem 
has not been studied for electricity market, although many applications of this 
problem arise from e-commerce; for example, coalitions allow buyer to benefit the 
price discounts by purchasing in bulk [45].  
In that perspective, we seek to understand the cooperative behavior of 
electricity buyers using evolutionary approach in a cooperative game framework. 
In this study, a theorem was proved and served as a link between the payoff 
distribution problem in cooperative game theory and the OCSG problem, thus 
forming a theoretically fundamental background for the proposed methodology. 
Moreover, while existing literature over-simplifies the market model by 
introducing only a few participants (typically less than 6), our studies can handle 
much larger number of buyers, taking fully into account the physical and technical 
constraints of the power network. 
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This research seeks to understand the cooperative behavior of electricity 
buyers through two situations: deterministic situation and stochastic situation. In 
the deterministic situation as presented in Figure 3.1, buyers co-evolve and find 
out the optimal bidding strategies to maximize their payoffs. The solution to the 
problem corresponds to a particular market state, which is the outcome from the 
market simulation. A market state includes information about the bidding 
strategies of players, the generated and dispatched electric power, the nodal prices, 




Figure 3.1: Co-evolutionary approach for deterministic situation 
 
In the stochastic situation as presented in Figure 3.2, a market database consisting 
of different market states has been generated. Using the information from this 
database, buyers co-evolve and find out the optimal cooperation strategy to hedge 
against the risk of low payoffs. The quality of a coalition is measured through a 
characteristic function that depends on the nature and purpose of cooperation. 
After different coalitions are formed, members in each coalition can use a fair 
scheme to share the payoffs among themselves. A theorem will be proved to 







Figure 3.2: Cooperative Game approach for stochastic situation 
 
In perspective of modeling the market using agent based approach and 
cooperative game, we use the terms “agent” and “player” interchangeably in the 
contexts without potential confusion. Similarly, the term “payoff” is used 
alternatively with “profit”. Moreover, these terms correspond to buyers since we 




3.1 Co-evolutionary approach for deterministic situation  
Standard evolutionary algorithms are highly simplified models inspired from the 
famous Darwinian theory of natural selection. They are applied directly on a well-
defined objective function: all individuals are evaluated using the same objective 
function. In a more complicated manner, co-evolution between individuals of 
different species in their environment can give various feedback mechanisms to 
computing complex objective functions. The purpose of co-evolution in computer 
science is to produce a dynamic similar to that of the arms race. Informally, the 
arms race best performance is achieved by each species while incrementing the 
performance of other species. The idea behind this concept is that a system may 
evolve better through reciprocal performance. In a co-evolutionary system, the 
evolution of different species must be considered simultaneously, because the 
evolutionary adaptation of a species can force the adaptation of others.  
 
3.1.1 Principles of Evolutionary Algorithms 
The idea of Evolutionary Algorithms is simply to build a random population of 
potential solutions to the problem. The “individuals” are then evaluated to 
encourage the reproduction of the fittest individuals, i.e. those who are closest to 
the optimal solution. The mechanisms of selection, recombination of most adapted 
individuals and mutation permit to gradually approach the desired solution. 
Evolutionary Algorithms have common core mechanism: it consists of making a 
population evolving by random transformation of some of its elements and 
application of the natural selection principle [46]. The principle of problem 
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solution using Evolutionary Algorithms is summarized in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: Problem solving using Evolutionary Algorithms 
 
The representation space that we actually study (where the evolution operators 
operate, also called the genotypes space) is often different from space in which the 
fitness is calculated (phenotypes space). To move from phenotypes space to 
genotypes space, an additional modeling or coding step is necessary. The 
representation or coding of an individual has to include fundamental 
characteristics of the problem. It must also be easily to be manipulated by 
recombination and mutation operators, allow easy transformation on the search 
space and generate feasible solutions. Coding can be binary or real valued. In 
general, the N individual population P(0) = {X1,. . . XN} is initialized through 
uniform drawing from the search space E while ensuring that all individuals meet 
the constraints. 
The Darwinian part of Evolutionary Algorithm consists of two steps: the 
reproduction step where parents are selected to recombine and the replacement 
step which replaces the worse individuals by better ones. The selection is an 
essential operator whose principle is to allow the best individuals of a population 
to reproduce. The adjustment of this mechanism is critical in the performance 
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of the Evolutionary Algorithm. If the individuals of a population are too similar, 
the following next generations may become more and more homogeneous. In this 
case, the evolution of a population may be summarized in the evolution of a single 
dominant individual, thus less exploration the search space. To perform an 
efficient search, we have to maintain a balance between the exploitation of good 
solutions found so far and the exploration of unknown areas of the search 
space. Excessive exploitation can lead to stagnation in a local optimum (premature 
convergence) while as an excessive exploration could lead to an almost random 
search (no convergence). 
In Evolutionary Algorithms, the exploration is realized by variation 
operators, which aim to generate new individuals from those previously selected. 
We distinguish between recombination and mutation. The principle of 
recombination is analogous to biological reproduction: The children inherit the 
qualities from their parents. Recombination is usually called crossover for binary 
representation. Mutation has the general idea of introducing variability in the 
population. This operator modifies one or more genes of the selected individual 
with a certain probability pm (0 ≤ pm ≤1). Mutation ensures ergodicity property 
(the capacity to cover the whole search space) for the Evolutionary Algorithms 
and the reintroduction of lost diversity. 
 
3.1.2 Towards Co-evolution 
In ecology a living individual is not only influenced by its own environment but 
also by other individuals in the environment as well as other processes as changes 
in climate or geographical structure. The notion of mutual dependence or inter-
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specific relationship between different species is named co-evolution. In a co-
evolutionary system, the evolution of a species must be considered 
simultaneously, because the evolutionary adaptation of a species can force the 
adaptation of others.  
Co-evolutionary algorithms are based on the principle of subjective 
function, where the fitness of an individual becomes estimation for other 
individuals interacting with it [47]. In co-evolutionary algorithms, individuals are 
evaluated based on their interactions with others. The nature of these interactions 
depends on the problem to be solved. In many problems, the individuals or 
populations compete with one another. This is called competitive co-evolution, 
which is widely applied in game playing strategies. On the other hand, an 
individual is rewarded when it contributes well in cooperation with other 
individuals in cooperative co-evolution. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Framework of Co-evolutionary Algorithms 
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The mechanism in which a participant determines its collaborators or competitors 
is among the most important factors for a successful application of co-
evolutionary algorithms. The most obvious (and computationally expensive) 
method to evaluate an individual is to let it interact with all potential collaborators 
or competitors, this is sometimes called pair-wise or complete interaction. 
Alternatively, collaborators / competitors can be selected by a variety of ways: 
uniformly random methods or methods based on fitness [48].  
The framework of Co-evolutionary Algorithm is represented in Figure 3.4. 
In this framework, every buyer is represented by a species, which is also an 
intelligent learning agent. The species interact with one another in the ecosystem, 
which in this case is the electric power market being simulated. They learn from 
the interaction and evolve. The fitness of an individual of a species is calculated 
when it interacts with other representatives from other species. The fitness 
function depends on different simulation scenarios. It is important to make a clear 
distinction between the stochastic nature of the proposed co-evolutionary 
approach and the deterministic nature of the situation being studied. As mention 
earlier, the co-evolutionary process leads to a particular market state, which is 
referred by being “deterministic”. This approach ultimately results in an 
equilibrium strategy vector that represents an ideal solution. However, in practice 
uncertainty is always present. For example, when a player varies its strategy even 
by a small amount, there could be large impact on the payoffs of all players. This 
fact is due to the physical constraint of the system and the incompleteness of 
information. Therefore, a practical study requires risk to be taken into account. 
That is also the motivation of the second approach in this paper. 
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3.2 Evolutionary Cooperative Game approach for stochastic 
situation 
3.2.1 Cooperative game concepts 
In this section, we introduce several concepts of cooperative game theory that will 
be later used. A cooperative game is a game where players can communicate 
freely with each other and enforce cooperative behavior by forming coalitions 
(e.g. in form of contract). Hence competition appears at level of coalitions of 
players, rather than between individual players. 
Let {1,2,..., }N n=  be a finite set of N players. A coalition S is a subset of 
N, in which the player members of S cooperate together. An empty coalition is a 
null set; a singleton coalition has only one member whereas the grand coalition is 
the set N of all players. The collection of coalitions can be formed by N players is 
denoted by 2N , which is actually the power set of N. A game ( , )N v  on N is 
defined by a characteristic function : 2Nv →ℝ , where ( )v S  represents the 
collective payoff that coalition S can assure by cooperation among its member, 
and is independent of the strategies of other coalitions. If the domain of the 
characteristic function v is restricted on a specific non-empty set 2S  instead of 2N , 
by abusing the notation v, we have a subgame ( , )S v  defined on S. We note that 
the grand coalition of the subgame ( , )S v  is the set S. 
The game ( , )N v  is called superadditive if its characteristic function 
satisfies the following property for all S and T subsets of N: 
( ) ( ) ( )v S T v S v T∪ ≥ +                                      (3.1) 
Superadditivity tells that a union coalition of player is at least as efficient as the 
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ensemble of disjoint separate coalitions. We note that in a supperadditive game, 
the grand coalition will form since it is the most efficient. On the other hand, the 
game is subadditive if   
( ) ( ) ( )v S T v S v T∪ ≤ + .                                    (3.2) 
In this case, singleton coalitions will form, where all player act individually. 
Classically, it is often assumed that the characteristic function is 
superadditive in a cooperative game. However, in this study, we will consider 
both cases of superadditive and non-superadditive characteristic functions. 
In a Transferable Utility Game [49], the goal of cooperation is to 
maximize the total gain of the grand coalition and then distribute this amount 
among the members. A challenging problem in a cooperative superadditive game 
is the distribution of gains from cooperation. A payoff that satisfies individual and 
global rationality conditions is called an imputation – a distribution that benefits 
each player who cooperates in a game. Moreover, an imputation that satisﬁes 
group rationality is said to lie in the core of the game – a collection of stable 
imputations that no coalition can improve upon.   
In an alternative approach to the core theory, Shapley proposed a 
distribution of gains from the grand coalition of n players that calculates the 
payoff a player could reasonably expect before the game begins. Being the unique 
solution concept of a cooperative game which holds the axioms of symmetry, 
efficiency, additivity, and dummy player, the Shapley value is considered to be 
“fair” in that sense [50]. The Shapley value ( )i vϕ  of the game ( , )N v  for player i 















= −∑                (3.3) 
 
3.2.2 Optimal Coalition Structure Generation problem 
As we have seen previously, the grand coalition will be formed in case of a 
superadditive characteristic function. In reality, the characteristic function can be 
non-superadditive, giving rise to the problem of finding optimal coalition structure 
where different coalitions can be formed.  
Let consider the game ( , )N v  of n players and characteristic function v as 
defined above. A partition of N into disjoint and exhaustive coalitions is called a 
coalition structure. For example, a coalition structure CS of 5 players can be 
{(1,2),3, (4,5)}CS =  where (1, 2) , (3) and (4,5)  are three coalitions. The value 
of a coalition structure is defined in term of its social welfare  




V CS v S
∈
= ∑ .                                         (3.4) 
Where ( )kv S  is the value of coalition kS , calculated using the characteristic 
function of the game. The OCSG problem seeks to find a coalition structure CS* 
that maximizes its social welfare 
* arg max ( )CS V CS= .                                  (3.5) 
It is natural to ask whether the optimal coalition structure, found from a 
single objective optimization problem, is a reasonable group formation that can be 




Theorem:  Each coalition in the optimal coalition structure defines a 
cooperative superadditive subgame.  
Proof:   Let the optimal coalition structure of a game ( , )N v  be 
1 2* { , ,..., }kCS S S S= . We need to prove that each iS  defines a cooperative 
superadditive subgame ( , )iS v . We will prove by contradiction. 
Assume that there exists a coalition iS  such that the subgame ( , )iS v  is 
non-superadditive. That means we can partition iS  into 1iS  and 2iS  such that 
1 2( ) ( ) ( )i i iv S v S v S+ > . Let’s consider a new coalition structure CS’ by replacing 
iS  with 1iS  and 2iS . It is obvious that ( ') ( *)V CS V CS> , which means CS* is 
not the optimal coalition structure. Therefore, the theorem is proved by 
contradiction. 
 
This theorem is theoretically fundamental to our methodology. In this study 
about optimal cooperation strategies, we need to solve two problems 
simultaneously: The first problem is how players partition into coalitions, and the 
second problem is how the gains are fairly distributed among group members. To 
solve the second problem using Shapley value, each coalition must be 
superadditive, and this condition is satisfied by solving the first problem – optimal 
coalition structure generation. Figure 3.5 depicts our approach: Given a 
cooperative game ( , )N v , we first find the optimal coalition structure. Then 
Shapley allocation is applied for each coalition to provide its players with 
reasonable payoff shares. In particular, the characteristic function v is context 
defined since it depends on what the buyers seek for when cooperating. That 
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feature makes our approach universal. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Shapley allocation for Optimal Coalition Structure 
 
Our approach is very general in the sense that it can be applied for any 
characteristic function, whether superadditive or otherwise. 
 
3.3     Value at Risk and group characteristic function 
In financial industry, the most popular risk measure is Value at Risk (VaR), which 
is essentially a quantile on a loss distribution. In particular, Value at Risk (VaR) 
estimates how much a portfolio could lose due to market uncertainty over a time 
horizon and within a given confidence interval. In this study, the VaR is defined as 
the expected minimum profit for a given confidence level (1 )α− : 
Pr( ) 1VaRπ α≥ = − . 
Under this perspective, the VaR can be recognized as downside risk 
measure. The VaR is more efficient than a symmetric risk measure such as the 
variance because the later also includes the case where the profit values are better 
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than the expected profit.  
The confidence level depends on the extent of the player’s risk-aversion. 
Normally, a 95% confidence level is adopted by a player with moderate risk-
aversion. Under normal distribution assumption, the variance – covariance 
approach calculates the VaR of the payoff π  by  
1( ) ( ) ( )VaR E z απ π σ π−= −      (3.6) 
( )E π is the expected value of the pay off, ( )σ π  is the standard deviation of the 
payoff, 1z α−  depends on the confidence level. For 95% confidence level, 1
z α−  is 
equal to 1.65. ( )E π  and ( )σ π  are calculated from our random simulation 
database.  
As stated in Section II, our approach is very general in the sense that it can 
be applied for any characteristic function. In this part, we propose an explicit form 
of the characteristic function for the game:  
( 1) ( 1)
1( ) ( ). [ ( ) ( )].




v S VaR S e E z eαπ σ π
π π




= ∑   (3.7) 
S is a coalition of buyer, which is a subset of N, Sπ  is the total payoff of coalition 
S and S  is the number of members in S. The first factor of the characteristic 
function is the VaR of the total payoff of this coalition S, while the second 
measures the effect of group size through parameter a. Larger value of a means 
higher transaction cost among the group and thus having negative effect the 
characteristic function of the coalition. When parameter a is equal to zero, the 
transaction cost is zero and thus the grouping environment is ideal. This setting is 
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reasonable since in a larger group more transaction and communication cost is 
incurred; thus there exists a certain negative effect of the group size on the group 
efficiency.   
 
3.4    Chapter conclusions 
This chapter presents a general methodology to simulate power markets and study 
the behaviors of economic participant. Concepts of evolutionary / co-evolutionary 
algorithms and Cooperative Game theory have been highlighted. The following 
chapter will introduce the first model in this research, where the interactions in 



















In this section, we build a single-node power market model with uniform non-
discriminatory pricing, which means buyers and generators on only one bus are 
studied. Since the power market is supposed to be single-nodal, we do not take 
into account the congestion of transmission lines. Therefore, the local marginal 
prices are equal to the market clearing price. Moreover, since we focus on 
studying the behavior of the electricity buyers, the bidding strategies of the 
generators are assumed to be fixed. 
 
4.1 The single-node power market model 
The PoolCo model is chosen among the three models described in Chapter 2. The 
reasons of this choice are as follows:  
- PoolCo allows a greater number of autonomous agents than Bilateral 
Contracts model.  
- PoolCo model is more complex and dynamic than Bilateral Contracts 
model 
- PoolCo model can validate the proposed co-evolutionary methodology 
more efficiently than the Hybrid model, which is too complicated within 




The operation of the electricity spot market takes place every hour from days to 
days. This is modeled as a repeated game in which the players compete against 
one another to maximize its own profit or cooperate to maximize the total profit of 
the group. A group here may include several buyers or all buyers.  
At the start of each round, the participants submit their bidding curves, and 
the Independent System Operator clears the market by intersecting the aggregated 
demand curve of buyers and the aggregated supply curve of generators. Each 
generator is paid at the market clearing price for the quantity of power they have 
supplied, and each buyer has to pay at the market clearing price for the quantity of 
power they have received.  
 
4.2 Generator and buyer models 
We approximate the total production cost of a generator as a quadratic function: 
CG(Q) = b0 + b1Q + b2Q
2
  (bj > 0 ∀j)          (4.1) 
Q is the quantity the generator sells in this round, and bj are the cost coefficient of 
this generator. Each generator has its minimum and maximum power output. The 
data of 4 generators used in this work is given in the table below: 
 
Table 4.1: Data of generators 




1, 2 3000 32 0.0065 200 3000 
3, 4 2000 30 0.0060 200 3000 





A buyer is characterized by the revenue function     
R = a1Q - a2Q
2    
(aj > 0 ∀j)           (4.2) 
The revenue function of a buyer stands for its performance. Intuitively, the 
revenue function tells us how much profit a buyer can make using the quantity of 
power Q it has purchased. 
The efficiency level of each buyer is determined by the coefficients a1 and 
a2. A buyer is efficient if he has large value of a1 and small value of a2. 
The coefficients used in this work are: 
 
Table 4.2: Data of buyers 
Buyers a1 a2 
1, 2 61 0.002 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 60 0.002 
9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 59 0.002 
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 58 0.002 
 
 
The reason of dividing 20 buyers into 4 groups of efficiency level is to 
facilitate the observation of their strategic behavior. We expect that the buyers 
with same level of efficiency will behave similarly throughout the simulation. 
If the MCP of the current round is λ and the quantity of power the buyer received 
is Q, the buyer will earn a profit of 
π (Q, λ) = a1Q + a2Q
2  
- λQ          (4.3) 
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This profit depends on both the market clearing price λ and the quantity Q that the 
buyer receives from the auction (the market equilibrium is the intersection point of 
the aggregated demand function and the aggregated supply function). The buyers 
will play a bidding game to find out the strategy that maximizes their profit. 
 
4.3 The bidding model and market calculation 
The bidding curve of a participant in the market is a piece-wise linear function 
with K segments. For simplification, K prices are defined in advance, and are the 
same for all participants. The participants only bid K quantities corresponding to 
K fixed prices to form a decreasing demand curve or an increasing supply curve. 
In this work, the predefined prices are 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70 ($/MW).  A seller 
bids increasing supply curve and a buyer bids decreasing demand curve. The 
illustration of bidding curves of sellers and buyers are shown below. 
 




Figure 4.2:  Bidding curve of buyers 
 
As discussed previously, the sellers keep their bidding strategy unchanged. 
We suppose that they follow marginal bidding procedure, i.e. at a given price P, 
the sellers bid a power quantity: Q = b1 + 2b2P. If the corresponding quantity Q 
excesses the generator capacity, it will bid QGmax. The buyers are allowed to bid 
any quantity between 0 and 700 MW, which is their maximum capacity. 
So far, we have only taken into account the bidding curves of just one 
seller and of just one buyer.  Usually there are many sellers and buyers with 
deferent supply and demand functions who participate in the market.  To compute 
the market equilibrium, we have to aggregate these curves into one aggregated 
supply function and one aggregated demand function. The aggregated curves will 
be used to calculate the Market Clearing Price (MCP) and the total traded power 
volume. First we consider the combining of supply functions followed by the 
combining of demand functions. 
The purpose of combining the supply functions is to find out how much 
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energy the generators are willing to sell at most to a certain per-unit price.  
Therefore, at each price the quantities bid by all generators have to be added.  Due 
to the capacity limit of the generators and the piece-wise linear form of the 
bidding curves, a compact formula cannot express the supply functions. 
Consequently, it is not easy to do the aggregation symbolically. An efficient 
solution is to discretize the prices and aggregate all quantities at each discrete 
price value. Figure 4.3 shows an example where CG1inc and CG1inc are aggregated 
to get CG1inc at the price λG. 
 
Figure 4.3: Aggregation of demand curves 
 
The only difference between demand curves and supply curves is that a demand 
curve has negative slope. The aggregation procedure for demand curves is exactly 
the same as for supply curves. 
 Once we have obtained the aggregated supply and demand curves, we can 
apply the method of computing the MCP and the total traded volume as in the spot 
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market model. The aggregated incremental supply and demand curves are 
presented in the same graph. The per-unit price at the intersection of the two 
curves is the MCP. The power-value at this point corresponds to the total 
produced and purchased power. The intersection determines the MCP and the total 
traded volume because it is where the quantities of sellers and consumers match. 
We also have to take note that sometimes the aggregated curves do not 
intersect. This is the case when the maximum power the buyers want to purchase 
is smaller than the minimum power the generators produce. Another case where 
there is no intersection is when the minimum power volume the buyers want to 
purchase is bigger than the maximum volume the generators are able to produce. 
If one of these two cases happens, there is no solution for this market round. 
 
Figure 4.4: Calculation of Market Clearing Price 
 
4.4 The co-evolution model 
In this simulation model, every buyer is represented by a species, which is also a 
continuous learning agent. The species interact with one another in the ecosystem, 
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which is the competitive power market. They “learn” from the interaction and 
evolve. The fitness of an individual of a species is calculated when it interacts 
with other representatives from other species. The fitness function depends on 
different simulation scenarios. If a buyer i tries to maximize his own profit, his 
fitness function is simply given by (3): 




- λQ                    (4.4) 
On the other hand, if buyer i cooperates in a group G with L members, G = { j1, j2, 
…jL }, his fitness function is the total profit of all buyers in this group: 
Fitnessi  =  ∑ πj(Qj , λ)     with  j ∈ G                       (4.5) 
Each species is a population consisting of a number of chromosomes.  The length 
of the chromosomes is the number of pairs power quantify – price in one bid; each 
chromosome encodes one bidding strategy of that buyer species.  
We build a simple market clearing block. The input to the market clearing 
block will be each bidding strategy of the buyer we are considering, combined 
with the representative strategies from the rest, together with the fixed bidding 
strategies of the sellers. The output from the market clearing block is the market 
clearing price (MCP) and power received by each buyer corresponding to the 
above situation. Base on this information, we can calculate the benefit of every 
buyer, which will serve in calculating the fitness of the corresponding strategy 
chromosome. Here, in order to facilitate good convergence of the co-evolutionary 
algorithm, we choose heuristically the best chromosome of each species to be the 








t = 1 
For each buyer 
    Randomly initialize a sub population of strategies for round t = 1 




While not stop do 
     t = t +1 
    For each buyer i 
               Evaluate the fitness of each strategy j  
                      (Based on the representatives from round t - 1)  
              Choose the representative strategy for this round t         
              Evolution of buyer i: selection, crossover, mutation 
   End for 
   All representative strategies are combined to get the market output of this 




Figure 4.5: Pseudo code of the proposed Co-evolutionary Algorithm 
 
The key of co-evolutionary algorithms is the choice of the representatives. At 
generation t, a buyer has to forecast the strategies that other buyers will use in this 
generation. In competitive co-evolution, each buyer only knows the fitness of his 
own strategies. Therefore, each buyer assumes that the rest will use their most 
updated strategies, which are the strategies from previous round t-1. In 
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cooperative co-evolution, each buyer in the group evolves one after another, and 
the strategies to be used in this round are gradually made available within the 
group. After going through evolution, a buyer will inform other buyers in the 























This chapter simulates the proposed single-node market model. In our 
implementation, one buyer is associated with a population of 20 chromosomes. 
Intermediate recombination is used to generate new individuals form the selected 
parents. We also use elitism by replacing the worst strategy in each generation 
with the best strategy found so far. The mutation rate is set as 0.1 Moreover, we 
allow each buyer to realize a total of 2 evolutionary generations against the 
representatives strategy of other players, before the evolution of the next buyer 
takes place. This is called sub-evolution, and it aims to accelerate the convergence 
of the algorithm. 
 
5.1 Competition scenario 
In this scenario, all buyers play individually to maximize their own profits. The 
fitness of each buyer is calculated using (4). Since all bids are submitted 
individually, each buyer has no information about the bids of other participants in 
this round, only the bids from previous rounds are known. Thus, each buyer 
forecasts that others will use their previous round strategies. This is actually his 
choice of representatives. We have run a simulation of 500 generations with 6 
generators and 20 buyers and the results are described in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. 
We observed that buyers with similar level of efficiency behave similarly; 
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therefore we choose to report the evolution of buyers 1, 3, 9 and 15. 
We observe that the profits of all buyers decrease compare to what they 
gain in the first randomly initialized generation. All buyers try to adjust their bids 
to get maximum profits in response to their opponents’ strategies. Therefore there 
is a competition between them that leads to an equilibrium situation. As expected, 
all buyers with same efficiency level will behave similarly, and thus get quite 
similar profits. Buyers 1 and 2 who are most efficient get highest profits. Next are 
buyers 3 to 8, then following by buyers 9 to 14 and buyers 15 to 20 get least 
profits because they are least efficient.  
The reason of the reduction in profit is the increasing of the market 
clearing price as we can see on Figure 5.2. Because all buyers want to gain more 
profit, they bid more quantities at the same price as before. This also means a right 
shift of the aggregated demand curve, which results in a higher equilibrium price. 
We observe that efficient buyers 1 to 8 could manage to get the maximum power 
of 700 MW while less efficient buyers cannot get their maximum capacities. The 
low efficient level of these buyers has limited their quantity bidding: higher 
market clearing price will just cause them a loss. 
 




Figure 5.2: Evolution of MCP (Competition scenario) 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Evolution powers dispatched (Competition scenario) 
 
5.2 Verification of Nash equilibrium 
An interesting question is whether the equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. Nash 
equilibrium is the situation where every buyer has no incentive to unilaterally 
change his current strategy, which is the strategy that maximizes his payoff 
whatever the strategies played by the others.  
 We can give an answer to this question by using co-evolutionary 
approach, in which we let one buyer evolve while the strategies of others are 
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fixed. If the evolving buyer cannot get a better situation than his equilibrium 
profit, the stable situation is Nash equilibrium. A typical case when buyer 1 
evolves and other buyers use their stable strategies is shown in Figure 5.4.  
It is found that the whole system gets back to its stable situation in less 
than 15 generations. The result shows that the evolving buyer cannot get more 
than what he got in the equilibrium (2380.00$). The tests for other buyers give 




Figure 5.4: Evolution of buyer 1’s profit (Nash equilibrium) 
 
5.3 Cooperation scenario 
In this scenario, all buyers cooperate with the goal of maximizing the total profit. 
Therefore, the fitness of a strategy chromosome which is calculated using (5) is 
the total profit of all buyers when the buyer in consideration uses that strategy. 
This is equivalent to solving a multi-objective optimization problem, where each 
objective is to maximize the profit of one buyer. The choice of maximizing the 
total profit of all buyers is equivalent to using an aggregate objective function, 
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which is in the form of a non-weighted linear sum.   
Since all buyers cooperate, the information about the bid to be submitted 
this round is made available step by step. With this mechanism, a worse total 
profit due to the ill-cooperation of the buyers can be avoided. In our 
implementation this is modeled as following: The first buyer evolves according to 
the bids from previous round (that means he assumes that the representatives of 
other buyers are their bids from previous round), then he informs his best strategy 
– the strategy he will submit this round to other buyers. The second buyer evolves 
according the bid from previous round, plus the “sure to happen” strategy of buyer 
1 who has just informed him. The information gradually becomes certain and the 
last buyer can evolve with complete knowledge of the strategies of other buyers in 
this round. This approach is somehow similar to elitism: the buyers who evolve 
later keep track of the best strategies so far found by those evolved before him. 
The results of the simulation are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. We note 
that it takes longer time to reach equilibrium in this case. To facilitate the 
comparison, we report in Table 5.1 the profits and powers dispatched at the 
generation 500 in the cooperation scenario, together with the percentage change 
compared to the equilibrium situation in the competition scenario. As expected, 
the total profit keeps increasing. The total profit in this case is 81996.85$, which 
increases 262.02% compared to the previous competition case. It is clear that the 
cooperation helps to increase the total profit. 
But it is also interesting to look at individual profits. We see that while the 
profits of almost every buyer increase, the profit of buyer 19 decreases by 79.7%. 
We note that this buyer is of lowest level of efficiency. A possible explanation is 
that the worst buyers will “sacrifice” by limit their quantity bids to help increase 
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the total profit of the group, which is now the common goal. It is clear that the 
result reflects real life fact. If we consider all buyers as a population, with the total 
profit as the fitness, the disappearance of least efficient buyers reflects the core 
principle of evolution: only the best will survive.  
Moreover, the profits of the buyers with same level of efficiency may vary. 
That is because of the goal is no more maximizing individual profits, but the total 
profit of all buyers. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Evolution of total profit (Cooperation scenario) 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Evolution of MCP (Cooperation scenario) 
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The reason for an increase in profits is the decrease of MCP. All buyers 
have cooperated to pull down the MCP by decreasing their quantity bids. In other 
words, they have tried to make the MCP lower by shifting the aggregated demand 
function to the left. That is why the power dispatched decreases. 
 
Table 5.1: Equilibrium profits and powers dispatched (Cooperation scenario) 
 









1 9386.70 294.40% 647.10 -7.56% 
2 8658.04 263.78% 592.40 -15.37% 
3 5800.18 245.25% 415.20 -40.69% 
4 4819.61 186.88% 341.40 -51.23% 
5 4876.00 198.37% 345.60 -47.46% 
6 7405.01 354.56% 539.70 -17.40% 
7 7021.42 319.46% 509.50 -26.59% 
8 6480.59 286.63% 467.40 -32.86% 
9 4198.68 341.84% 319.00 -44.82% 
10 3037.28 222.82% 227.60 -59.36% 
11 4054.39 345.51% 307.50 -40.06% 
12 3408.12 272.54% 256.50 -50.63% 
13 3248.13 238.26% 244.00 -59.37% 
14 3634.86 279.36% 274.30 -53.94% 
15 592.14 58.95% 46.60 -85.55% 
16 1549.06 308.23% 123.40 -63.38% 
17 1507.20 293.49% 120.00 -65.24% 
18 1217.82 224.6% 96.60 -70.52% 
19 75.45 -79.7% 5.90 -98.18% 
20 1026.17 157.1% 81.20 -79.46% 




5.4 The free rider problem 
So far we have observed the scenarios where all buyers compete against one other 
or cooperate together.  In this section, we simulate the case of incomplete 
cooperation where buyer 1 plays individually while others cooperate. Since we 
have observed the effect of different buyer’s efficiency levels, in this experiment 
we choose to simulate 20 similar buyers in term of efficiency level to facilitate the 
observation of results. The 6 generators are kept unchanged and 20 buyers are 
copies of buyer 1 in Table 4.2. In order to compare different scenarios, we run a 
simulation with 1400 generations as followed: Competition from generation 1 to 
100, complete cooperation from generation 101 to 700, competition from 
generation 701 to 800 and incomplete cooperation from generation 801 to 1400. 
The reason to insert a scenario of competition in the beginning and between 
complete and incomplete scenarios is to give a same starting point for all buyers. 
Since all buyers have similar revenue functions, we report the results of buyer 1 – 
the buyer playing alone in incomplete cooperation scenario and the average result 
of other buyers. 
We observe in Figure 5.7 that when all buyers cooperate, they get better 
profits compared to competition. However, when buyer 1 plays individually 
against the cooperation of others, he gets even more profit. As we have known 
form previous experiments, when buyers cooperate they try to pull down the MCP 
by limit their quantity bids. On the other hand, buyer 1 who is now playing 
individually doesn’t need to limit his quantity bids, but he still enjoys the low 
MCP thanks to the cooperative effort of other buyers. That is why buyer 1 gets 
very high profit in this case. He is called a free rider.  
51 
 
We see in Figure 5.8 that the MCP in incomplete cooperation scenario is 
lightly higher than in complete cooperation case, that’s because of the non-
cooperation of buyer 1. Therefore the average profit of other buyers is slightly less 
in this case compared to complete cooperation. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Evolution of profit (different scenarios) 
 
 





Figure 5.9: Evolution of powers dispatched (different scenarios) 
 
The simulation results can lead to a situation similar to the prisoner 
dilemma. A buyer, desiring to become a free rider to get very high profit, will play 
individually with the hope that others will cooperate. Since every buyer has 
incentive to do so, the market will ultimately become completely competitive, and 
thus all buyers get low profit. 
 
5.5 Cooperation schemes for small buyers 
In previous experiments, every buyer can bid any quantity from 0 to 700 MW 
which is their capacity limits. In this section, buyers 3 to 20 are chosen to be small 
buyers, they can bid maximum 200 MW; buyers 1 and 2 are kept unchanged 
because they are large buyers. All coefficients of buyers’ revenue functions are as 
in Table 4.2. We propose 3 algorithms to study different cooperation schemes of 
small buyers: 




- Algorithm 2: This is a modification of algorithm 1. In this algorithm, a group 
is coded by a chromosome. A chromosome thus represents the strategies of all 
buyers in the group. 
- Algorithm 3: This is another modification of algorithm 1. The small buyers 
will cooperate to form a large buyer representing their group. That means 
instead of bidding individually, the group will bid the total power of every 
buyer in the group, then the received power will be shared to the members 
proportionally to their maximum capacity. 
The simulation results of 3 algorithms after 500 generations where the small 
buyers 3-20 cooperate and large buyers 1, 2 play individually are reported and 
compared with the competition scenario in Table 5.2. We observe that cooperation 
has helped most small buyers get higher profits in all three algorithms. Algorithm 
1 gives best total profit of small buyers, followed by algorithms 2 and 3. We recall 
that in algorithm 2, a chromosome represents a group of small buyers.  Therefore, 
the co-evolution happens actually among large buyers 1, 2 and the group of small 
buyer. In algorithm 3, the co-evolution is again among large buyers 1, 2 and the 









Table 5.2: Profits of small buyers in different cooperation schemes ($) 
Buyers Competition Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2 Algorithm 3 
1 1334.16 6510.00 6230.00 7140.00 
2 1315.94 6493.40 6230.00 7140.00 
3 471.16 1860.00 1667.45 760.97 
4 480.00 1860.00 844.92 760.97 
5 480.00 1693.77 1586.02 760.97 
6 480.00 1721.57 1329.11 760.97 
7 480.00 1738.59 1316.04 760.97 
8 480.00 1860.00 1635.78 760.97 
9 280.00 1041.48 304.36 688.18 
10 280.00 460.57 721.27 688.18 
11 280.00 0.00 871.50 688.18 
12 280.00 24.34 85.28 688.18 
13 280.00 199.90 397.03 688.18 
14 260.71 7.83 198.05 688.18 
15 64.69 53.03 199.96 615.39 
16 59.15 108.94 6.57 615.39 
17 53.92 0.00 759.58 615.39 
18 61.53 65.31 430.09 615.39 
19 53.27 241.32 206.43 615.39 
20 63.91 115.81 122.80 615.39 
Total profits 
Of small buyers 
(3 to 20) 
4888.34 13052.47 12682.23 12387.18 
 
 
Although algorithm 3 gives less total profit of small buyers than algorithm 
1 and 2, it ensures a good sharing of the electricity power received for less 
efficient small buyers. In algorithms 1 and 2, inefficient buyers could get very low 
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profits (buyers 11 and 17 get zero profit in algorithm 1 and buyer 16 get 6.57 $ of 
profit in algorithm 2). Therefore, small buyers with low level of efficiency (buyers 
9 to 20) would highly appreciate the scheme of cooperation as in algorithm 3 
where they get high profits thanks to the efficiency of their group mates. On the 
other hand, efficient small buyers (buyers 3 to 8) would appreciate the cooperation 
schemes as in algorithm 1 and 2, where they are ensured high profits thanks to 
their efficiency. 
 
5.6 Summary of result analysis 
With the simulations of the single-node power market model, we have examined 
some important issues in the bidding strategies of buyers in electricity market. In 
the first scenario where all buyers play individually, a competition among them 
takes place and pull up the MCP due to their large quantity bids. The result is that 
the market comes to equilibrium where everybody gets low profit compared to 
other scenarios.  Moreover, we have shown that the equilibrium is actually a Nash 
equilibrium by evolving the strategy of one buyer and letting other buyers play 
their equilibrium strategies. In the second scenario where all buyers cooperate, we 
can see a significant drop in MCP thanks to the reduction in quantity bids of all 
buyers. Therefore, most of buyers get better profits. The first lesson taken from 
these two simulations is that trying to get more quantity is not always a good 
choice because this can make the MCP become very high. A better strategy is to 
cooperate by limiting the quantity bids and thus get lower MCP, which can lead to 
very high profits. The second lesson is that inefficient buyers might not want to 
cooperate with efficient buyers to maximize the total profit, because cooperation 
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in a group can also mean to sacrifice by giving the priority of bidding large 
quantities to efficient buyers in order to maximize the total profit of the group. 
In the third scenario where there is one buyer plays individually against the 
cooperation of others, we find that the free rider problem arises. The free rider is 
the buyer who does not cooperate. Without cooperation, the free rider doesn’t 
have to limit his quantity bids, but still enjoys the low MCP thanks to the 
cooperation of others. It’s true that cooperation helps each buyer to get more 
profit, but it is actually the free rider who benefits the most. We also point out that 
this result might affect the decision to cooperate or not of the buyers through a 
mechanism similar to the prisoner dilemma. In fact, since the free rider benefits 
the most, all buyers hope to be a free rider. As a consequence, none of them will 
cooperate, and the market will be completely competitive, which is the least profit 
situation for most of the buyers. 
In the last section, three different cooperation schemes for small buyers 
have been proposed. It is found that efficient buyers would appreciate the 
cooperation scheme where they can draw more profits thanks to the “sacrifice” in 
the bid quantities of inefficient small buyers. Another cooperation scheme for 
small buyers is to form a large buyer by bidding their total quantities demanded, 
and then share the quantities received. This scheme of cooperation is highly 
appreciated by inefficient small buyers because they are equally shared the power 
quantities and enjoy good MCP thanks to the high performance of efficient small 
buyers. However, the formation of a new large buyer from small buyers may not 









We build a multi-node model of a power market, which means buyers and 
generators are located on different buses. Therefore it is necessary to take into 
account the technical constraints and congestion limits of the transmission 
network. The spot prices depend on buses - the locations of generators / buyers in 
the network, and are called local marginal price (LMP) or nodal price. Moreover, 
since we focus on studying the behavior of electricity buyers, the bidding 
strategies of generators are assumed to be fixed.  
 
6.1 The multi-node power market model 
In this paper, the PoolCo model is chosen because of the same reasons as in the 
single-node model. We simulate the power market using spot pricing theory [51]. 
In each bidding round, generators and buyers submit bid curves to the pool 
operator which runs an optimization routine to determine the power dispatch 
results, which are generation, load dispatchs and spot prices.  Generators are then 
paid a price according to their bids and consumers must pay a price according to 
their bids. 
The operation of the power spot market is modeled as a game in which the 
actual players are electricity buyers, because generators use fixed strategies. 
Players can choose to compete against one another or cooperate to accomplish 
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their goal in an optimal way. 
 
6.2 Generator and buyer models 
As usually seen in power system studies, the total production cost of a generator j 
is approximated as a quadratic function:  
2
0 1 2( )j j j j j j jC s b b s b s j G= + +       ∀ ∈     (6.1) 
G is the set of generators, js  is the electric power that generator j supplies in this 
round, and 0jb , 1jb , 2jb  are the cost coefficients of this generator j. The cost 
coefficients are positive and each generator has its minimum and maximum power 
output. 
A buyer i is characterized by the revenue function, which is symmetric to 
the cost function of a generator.     
2
1 2( )i i i i i iR d a d a d i L= −       ∀ ∈     (6.2) 
L is the set of buyers, id  is the electric power that buyer i is dispatched in this 
round, and 1ia , 2ia   are the revenue coefficients of this buyer i. The cost 
coefficients are positive and each buyer also has its minimum and maximum 
power demand as will be discussed further in this section. In a particular round, if 
the LMP of buyer i is λi  and the electricity power received is id , this buyer will 
earn a profit of 
2
1 2( , ) ( )i i i i i i i i id a d a d dπ λ λ= − −     (6.3) 
Since the profit depends on both the LMP and the power received, each buyer has 
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to choose an optimal bidding strategy to maximize their profits. 
The revenue function of a buyer stands for its intrinsic performance. 
Intuitively, the revenue function tells us how much profit a buyer can make using 
the electricity power it has purchased. The efficiency level of each buyer is 
determined by the coefficients 1ia  and 2ia . A buyer is efficient if it has large value 
of 1ia  and small value of 2ia  . However, in this study we assume that buyers are 
homogenous, which means they all have the same revenue function. The 
convenience of this is, besides simplicity, a better interpretation of the interaction 
among buyers in different bus on the network. 
In reality, the electricity power id  a buyer can buy is bounded and consists 
of a fixed amount miniQ  and a variable amount dispiq  which is the dispatchable 
electricity power: 
min maxi i dispi id Q q Q= + ≤                         (6.4)  
The variable   miniQ  is the minimum electricity power that the buyer needs to 
maintain a certain level of production or to satisfy certain consumption demand, 
maxiQ  is the maximum electricity power it can buy. By this mechanism, buyer i is 
assured to receive at least miniQ  MW, and the extra dispatchable electric power 
dispiq  depends on the dispatch results, which in its turn depend partially on the bids 
of the players.  The revenue of a buyer i is therefore 
2
1 min 2 min
2 2
1 min 2 min 1 2 min 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( 2 )
i i i i dispi i i dispi
i i i i i i i dispi i dispi
R d a Q q a Q q
a Q a Q a a Q q a q
= + − +
= − + − −
   
(6.5) 
We note that the term 21 min 2 min( )i i i ia Q a Q−  is constant and the revenue actually 
depends on the dispatchable electricity power dispiq . 
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6.3     The bidding model and market calculation 
In our model, each generator is allowed to bid a supply function and each buyer is 
allowed to bid a demand function to the system operator. A supply function ( )j jP s
represents the price at which a generator i is ready to sell if the power it has 
produced is js  . Similar interpretation is applied for buyers. 
  Base on the bidding information as well as the network configuration, the 
operator solves an optimal power flow (OPF) problem to determine the 
generation, load dispatch and LMPs while satisfying physical and operational 
constraints. The objective of OPF problem is to maximize the social welfare W, 
which is equal to the total buyer benefits minus the total generator costs.  
, ,max ( ) ( ) ( )
. . ( )
( )
x s d i i j j
i L j G
W R d C s
s t
∈ ∈
   = −
      =
≤
∑ ∑s,d
h x, s,d 0
g x, s,d 0
   (6.6) 
x  is the state vector consisting of system voltages and angles, s is the vector of 
generated power, d is the vector of dispatched power, ( )h x, s, d are equality 
constraints such as the power flows equations, ( )g x, s,d are inequality constraints 
such as line flow limits. Details on OPF problem could be found in textbooks 
about electrical power system.  
It is well known from microeconomics theory that in a market with perfect 
competition, the social welfare is maximized when the players bid their marginal 
cost / revenue function. However, in an electric power market, the physical 
constraints of the network gives certain market power to some players and thus 
discourage them from bidding marginally. 
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In this study, the bids of generators are assumed to be fixed. More specifically, the 
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∂    (6.7) 
Buyers bid strategically rather than bid their true marginal revenue function. A 
strategy or a bid of a certain buyer is defined by a coefficient ik  that is multiplied 
to the true marginal revenue function to get demand function: 
1 2
( )
( ) ( 2 )
j i
i i i i i i i
i
R d





   (6.8) 
We note that a rational buyer would bid 1ik ≤ . This method of bidding also 
means to multiply the revenue function used in OPF formulation by ik . In fact, 
from the view of the pool operator, submitted bids are considered to reflect the 
true marginal curves of the participants. Therefore, the revenue function of buyer i 
as being viewed by the pool operator is:  
2
1 min 2 min
2
1 2 min 2
( ) ( ) ( )
( 2 )
bid
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i dispi i i dispi
R d k R d k a Q a Q
k a a Q q k a q
= = −
+ − −
   (6.9) 
For a specific strategy ik , the constant 
2
1 min 2 min( )i i i i ik a Q a Q−  can be excluded from 
the OPF problem. The objective function of the maximization problem is 
therefore: 
2
1 2 min 2( ) ( 2 ) ( )i i i i dispi i i dispi j j
i L j G
W k a a Q q k a q C s
∈ ∈
= − − −∑ ∑disps,d       (6.10) 
Note that the objective function depends on the supply and dispatchable power.  




A black box simulator is built to integrate bidding strategies and solve 
OPF problem. The input to OPF solver consists of a network configuration, the 
cost function coefficients of generators, the maximum powers of generators, the 
revenue function coefficients of buyers, the must serve powers miniQ  and max 
capacities maxiQ  of buyers. The output from the simulator consists of the LMPs iλ  

















Chapter 7: IMPLEMENTATION OF MULTI-NODE 
POWER MARKET MODEL  
 
 
7.1 Test network 
Using the multi-node power market model as proposed in previous chapter, we 
implement an IEEE 14-bus network with 7 generators representing electricity 
sellers and 18 loads representing electricity buyers. This test network is chosen 
because it integrates physical and technical constraints as in practice and consists 
of a large enough number of seller / buyer agents to validate the proposed 
approach. Besides, our approach will also be tested on a IEEE 30 bus system. The 
14 bus network is shown in Figure 7.1, where loads are represented by arrows and 
generators are represented by circular objects. Power is delivered into and drawn 
from the network busbars. Busbars are interconnected via transmission lines 
which have an upper limit to the amount of power they can transmit.  
 




To observe the influence of the physical network on players’ performance, 
we suppose that all buyers are homogenous, which means they have the same 
revenue function. The common revenue function is characterized by 1 1 80ia a= = ,  
 for all buyers. Other parameters of buyers are summarized in Table 7.1. 
The last column, which will be discussed later, is the profits of buyers when they 
all bid marginally ( 1.0ik =  for all buyers). 
 




Max   







1 2 45.0 67.5 22.5 2186.72 
2 2 49.0 73.5 24.5 2336.99 
3 2 55.0 82.5 27.5 2548.9 
4 4 48.0 72.0 24.0 2177.76 
5 4 50.0 75.0 25.0 2245.99 
6 6 44.0 66.0 22.0 773.48 
7 6 55.0 82.5 27.5 830.72 
8 6 47.0 70.5 23.5 794.49 
9 6 50.0 75.0 25.0 811.45 
10 8 42.0 63.0 21.0 266.58 
11 8 55.0 82.5 27.5 214.95 
12 8 46.0 69.0 23.0 273.57 
13 10 50.0 75.0 25.0 1004.35 
14 10 54.0 81.0 27.0 1036.1 
15 10 55.0 82.5 27.5 1042.91 
16 12 50.0 75.0 25.0 453.72 
17 14 48.0 72.0 24.0 350.63 
18 14 55.0 82.5 27.5 366.22 
    Total 19715.53 
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7.2  Market database 
Firstly, a database of the power market was constructed. This will provide the 
reference case for studying the deterministic situation and permit the calculation 
of characteristic function in the stochastic situation.  The database can be viewed 
as historical data of a market in which agents possess no intelligence. We have 
performed 100 thousands random simulations using the proposed model with 
strategies ik  of buyers uniformly distributed between 0.3 and 1. The rationale for 
that choice of as follow: We ran 60, 70, 80, 85, 90, 95 and 100 thousands random 
simulations sequentially. It was observed that the relevant statistics (average 
values and standard deviations of powers dispatched, LMPs and profits) converge 
from the number of 85 thousands samples. Therefore it is convincible that 100 
thousands random simulations could statistically represent the system with high 
confidence level. 
The average dispatchable power, the average LMP as well as the average 
and standard deviation of profits of buyers are reported in Table 7.2. The 
fluctuation index, which is equal to the standard deviation value divided by the 
average value, is also calculated for ease of comparison. This index reflects the 
relative profit fluctuation, measured in percentage of the average value. A low 
value of fluctuation index indicates a stable payoff, while a high value of 





















1 18.08 38.84 2187.95 254.67 0.12 
2 19.94 38.84 2350.45 260.41 0.11 
3 22.69 38.84 2579.89 267.20 0.10 
4 18.46 40.00 2204.33 274.21 0.12 
5 19.39 40.00 2280.75 277.15 0.12 
6 14.77 45.22 1683.94 271.91 0.16 
7 19.23 45.22 2008.07 299.81 0.15 
8 15.96 45.22 1776.64 280.82 0.16 
9 17.17 45.22 1866.12 288.78 0.15 
10 7.10 51.57 1151.19 362.62 0.31 
11 11.15 51.57 1406.51 413.55 0.29 
12 8.31 51.57 1241.03 387.07 0.31 
13 16.57 44.95 1867.01 262.74 0.14 
14 18.12 44.95 1980.73 265.88 0.13 
15 18.52 44.95 2008.50 267.01 0.13 
16 8.19 55.62 1028.89 501.05 0.49 
17 4.16 59.80 768.00 396.94 0.52 
18 4.44 59.80 830.60 455.01 0.55 
  Total 31220.60   
 
 
As can be observed from Table 7.2, buyers who are in the same bus in the 
network have similar fluctuation indices. This observation suggests the high 
influence of the physical constraints to the payoff of buyers. In fact, due to the 
particular location on the network, a buyer may have some market power - which 
is the ability to alter the electricity price with its strategy. On the other hand, a 
buyer in a location with high fluctuation index highly depends on the strategies of 
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others. Moreover, we can see a correlation between fluctuation indices and LMPs, 
which also vary largely among bus. On buses with low LMPs, buyers can make 
more profit by buying larger amount of electric power; therefore the average 
dispatchable powers are higher in these buses. 
In brief, a bus is considered stable if the fluctuation indices and the LMP 
of buyers on this bus are low, leading to high dispatchable powers.  Bus 2 (buyers 
1, 2, 3) is a typically stable bus. Contrarily, a bus with high fluctuation indices is 
considered unstable, such as bus 14 (buyers 17, 18). This simple statistical 
analysis has provided a very good overview on the performance of buyers in the 
network. In reality, buyers may have this kind of knowledge by learning through 
experience, and the large number of bidding simulations in this study actually 
models a long period the players participate in the market. Moreover, comparison 
between the last column of Table I and the 4th column of Table 7.2 proposes that 
even random bidding can return in better profits than marginal bidding. This 
observation confirms the incomplete competitive nature of the market. 
 
7.3 Chromosome structures 
Co-evolutionary algorithm was used in the deterministic situation. The fitness 
function depends on different simulation scenarios. If buyer i cooperates in a 
group S having l members, 1 2{ , ,..., }lS i i i= , its fitness function is the total profit of all 
buyers in this group: 
( ) ( , )k k k
k S
Fitness i dπ λ
∈
= ∑      (7.1) 
Each species is a population consisting of a number of chromosomes.  Each 
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chromosome is a real number in the interval [0.3, 1] that represents the coefficient 
ik  in the bid demand function and encodes one bidding strategy of that buyer 
species. 
In the stochastic situation, each chromosome encodes a coalition structure. 
More specifically, the length of a chromosome is the number of buyers n in the 
market. The value of the ith   allele of the chromosome, which can be any number 
between 1 and n, represents the coalition that buyer i is joining. It is noted that two 
different chromosomes can actually represent one coalition structure. Let’s take an 
example where there are 5 buyers: the chromosomes chrom1 = [11232] and 
chrom2 = [22141] both represent the coalition structure CS = {(1, 2), (4), (3, 5)} 
with 3 coalitions in total. While the search space is signiﬁcantly inﬂated with this 
representation, such many-to-one mappings simplify the problem and guards 
against disruptive crossover. The fitness of a chromosome c is the value of the 
coalition structure it encodes: 




Fitness c V CS v S
∈
= = ∑     (7.2) 
CS is the coalition structure coded by chromosome c and the sets kS  are the 











To validate the proposed approach, the system was simulated in different 
scenarios. The deterministic situation was studied firstly though individual 
bidding. Then players were allowed to cooperate by different schemes, where 
cooperation occurs in the whole player set or in smaller groups, and the condition 
to cooperate is or is not imposed. In the stochastic situation, the cooperation 
strategies were studied with different characteristic functions representing 
different group properties.   
 
8.1 Deterministic situation 
8.1.1 Individual bidding 
In this scenario, all buyers bid individually to maximize their own profits. The 
fitness of each buyer is calculated using (18), where each group C contains only 
one member. Since all bids are submitted individually, each buyer has no 
information about the bids of other participants in this round; therefore they are 
considered as competitive bidders. Each buyer chooses the previous round 
strategies of their rivals as representatives to evaluate the fitness function in the 





Figure 8.1: Comparision of random bidding and competitive bidding 
  
The co-evolutionary progress doesn’t lead to a stable state. It is observed 
that the payoffs of buyers fluctuate around certain average values. In this scenario 
where all players bid individually, there is strong competition among them for 
highest possible payoffs. Similar to real life deregulated markets, no players have 
enough market power to dominate the market; thus the strategic bidding progress 
is just like a fight with no winner. That’s why the market is not settled to a perfect 
equilibrium, but rather some kind of “dynamic equilibrium” around certain 
average values. The mean and standard deviation of payoffs in the competitive 
scenario is compared with the reference case in Figure 8.1. Unlike the reference 
case when all players bid randomly (in other word, they don’t have intelligence), 
in this competition, every player learns and evolves to choose the best strategy. 
Therefore the fluctuation of payoffs is smaller than the one in the random bidding 
case, as can be seen on Figure 8.1. It is also noted that some buyers can manage 
for better profits compared to random bidding, while the rest get lower profits. 
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With intelligence, certain players can make use of physical advantage, which 
depends on the location on the network, to improve the payoffs (buyers 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 16, 17, 18) while others, even with intelligence, perform worse because they 
don’t have that much advantage. Referring to Table 7.2, it is also interesting to 
note that players who perform better all have either lowest or highest fluctuation 
indices. 
 
8.1.2  Total cooperation 
In this scenario, all buyers cooperate with the goal of maximizing the total profit. 
The total cooperation is modeled by two key points: Cooperation in goal and 
cooperation in information. The common goal is reflected the fitness of a strategy 
chromosome, which is the total profit of all buyers when the buyer in 
consideration uses that strategy. Therefore the sum in (18) is taken over the whole 
set of buyers. This is similar to solving a multi-objective optimization problem, 
where each objective is to maximize the profit of one buyer. The choice of 
maximizing the total profit of all buyers is equivalent to using an aggregate 
objective function, which is in the form of a non-weighted linear sum of payoffs.  
Secondly, the cooperation in information is modeled as follows: the strategies of 
buyers are informed to the whole group and the optimal strategy vector is chosen 
under the agreement of all members. 
The best total profits over generations of one simulation are shown in 
Figure 8.2. It takes about 80 generations to reach equilibrium in this case. As 
expected, the total profit keeps increasing. The total profit in this case is 37846.61 
$, which increases by 20% compared to the reference case. It is clear that 
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cooperation helps to increase the total profit. 
But it is also interesting to look at individual profits reported in Table 8.1. 
We see that while the profits of almost every buyer increase, the profits of buyers 
7, 9, 13, 15 decrease. This fact suggests an improved cooperation scheme that can 
assure acceptable payoff for every player. 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Evolution of total profit under total cooperation 
 
8.1.3 Total cooperation with Pareto improvement 
Pareto efficiency is a concept in economics with many applications in 
engineering. Given an initial allocation of payoff among a set of players, a Pareto 
improvement is defined as a change in the allocation that makes at least one 
individual better off and no worse for any other. An allocation where no further 
Pareto improvements can be made is called Pareto efficiency. In a multi criteria 
decision making problem, there are usually many different Pareto efficient 
allocations and they form the Pareto frontier. However, seeking for that frontier is 
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not our objective. In this part about total cooperation, we only seek for a Pareto 
improvement that is good as possible, compared to the reference case.  
The common objective function, which is the total payoff of all buyers, 
remains the same as previous simulation. The selection process in the co-evolution 
is modified as followed to integrate Pareto constraint: 
- Between two strategy vectors that both lead to Pareto improvements, the 
one with higher fitness will be chosen. 
- A strategy vector that leads to a Pareto improvement will always be 
preferred to a strategy vector that does not, regardless of its fitness value. 
 
A typical simulation result is shown in Figure 8.3. In the first 25 generations, there 
are rises and drops in total profits. Each drop in total profit marks a discovery of a 
new strategy vector that leads to Pareto improvement, and thus being the 
replacement for previous strategy vectors (that do not satisfy Pareto condition). 
From Table 8.1, we observe that the payoffs in the end of the simulation are 
Pareto-improved compared to the reference case. More specifically, buyers 7, 9, 
13, 15 who had worse payoff than the reference case in previous cooperation now 
achieve better results. Of course, the tradeoff is slightly lower profits for other 
buyers compared to the previous cooperation without Pareto constraint. Nerveless, 
all players still have considerably better payoffs than in the reference case. Pareto 
constraint in some sense has implied the redistribution of payoffs, which makes 





Figure 8.3: Evolution of total profit under total cooperation with Pareto 
improvement 
 
8.1.4 Group cooperation 
As we have seen in previous simulations, cooperation with the participation of all 
players leads to better outcome compared to the reference case. However, in 
really, the number of players could be very large and such total cooperation would 
be impracticable. In fact, cooperation naturally happens among smaller groups in 
which members have close relationship are share common goal.  
To verify this assumption, statistical analysis on the market database has 
been carried out. Firstly, for each buyer, we implemented a linear regression of the 
payoff on the strategies of all buyers in the market. Mathematically, with n buyers, 








= +∑      (8.1) 
The regression coefficients measure the sensitivity of a particular player payoff 
versus the strategies of others. The larger the absolute value of jc is, the higher the 
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influence of player j on player i is. Secondly, for each player, we calculated the 
correlations between its payoff and others’ payoffs. It is observed that the 
statistical analysis results are similar for all buyers; therefore only the results for 




Figure 8.4: Statistical analysis of buyer 3’s correlation with others 
 
From the analysis results, the profit of a buyer is most affected by the 
strategies of other buyers on the same bus. Specifically, Figure 8.4 shows that the 
payoff of buyer 3 is highly affected by buyers 1 and 2 – those on the same bus. 
Moreover, the profits of buyers on the same bus are highly correlated. In fact, 
these buyers have common LMP and share a number of network technical 
parameters. This proximity suggests that they should form a group. Since buyers 
are located on 7 buses, we assume that 7 groups will be formed: group 1 consists 
of buyers 1, 2, 3; group 2 consists of buyers 4, 5 and so on.  
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Similarly to the total cooperation scheme, the fitness function of a buyer is 
now the total profit of buyers within the bus, and the bidding information is shared 
among group mates.  As in first simulation of total cooperation without Pareto 
constraint, while the total profit of a group increases, the profit of some members 
could be worse off. This fact is shown on Table 8.1. The profit of buyer 6 is less 
than in reference case. 
 












with redistr. of 
power ($) 
1 2187.95 2338.47 2257.16 2259.05 2259.05 
2 2350.45 2502.24 2413.69 2415.76 2415.76 
3 2579.89 2734.38 2635.00 2637.32 2637.32 
4 2204.33 2451.76 2355.53 2345.41 2345.41 
5 2280.75 2531.42 2431.18 2420.63 2420.63 
6 1683.94 2176.76 1947.09 1445.03 1901.18 
7 2008.07 1874.46 2297.73 2391.81 2259.96 
8 1776.64 2293.45 2048.12 2128.51 2003.65 
9 1866.12 1729.06 2145.10 2230.63 2102.65 
10 1151.19 1591.61 1546.07 2034.17 1626.71 
11 1406.51 2792.24 1953.12 1819.87 2036.17 
12 1241.03 1724.79 1674.92 1563.47 1757.43 
13 1867.01 1758.98 2272.84 2137.32 2137.32 
14 1980.73 2598.45 2302.21 2259.7 2259.7 
15 2008.50 1907.38 2438.24 2289.17 2289.17 
16 1028.89 1600.34 1417.23 1484.12 1484.12 
17 768.00 1528.22 1435.27 1391.68 1391.68 
18 830.60 1712.59 1606.08 1556.13 1556.13 




An improved version of group cooperation is achieved when we integrate a 
method for redistribution of dispatchable power. More specifically, after the OPF 
solver decides the power to be dispatched, buyers on same bus will receive their 
minimum power required miniQ  and share the total dispatchable power 
proportionally to their maximum capacity maxiQ . This redistribution of 
dispatchable power makes use of technical advantages of power transmission in 
same bus. It is also necessary to emphasize that the redistribution is consistent 
because we assume homogeneous buyers. In fact, the common revenue function 
of buyers evaluates one MW of electricity the same way no matter it belongs to 
which buyer.  
The last column of Table 8.1 shows the outcome of group cooperation 
with redistribution of power. As expected, buyer 6 has improved the profit to 
1901.18$. We also note that the total profit in this case is slightly higher than in 
previous case without power redistribution (36884.04$ versus 36809.78$). The 
explanation is that power redistribution has allocated the resource in a better way.  
 
8.1.5 Comparison of different schemes of cooperation 
To evaluate the performance and stability of the proposed cooperation schemes, 
each of them was simulated 100 times; then the mean and standard deviation 
values of outcome payoffs were calculated. Each mean value is divided by the 
corresponding value in reference case to get the coefficient of improvement, and 
each standard deviation value is normalized by the corresponding mean value to 





Figure 8.5: Evaluation of different cooperation schemes 
 
The coefficient of improvement reflects how much a player is better off 
compared to the reference case. From the plot we observe that buyers in unstable 
buses such as buyer 10, 11, 12 (bus 8), buyer 16 (bus 12), buyers 17, 18 (bus 14) 
benefit the most by cooperation schemes. Other buyers with stable payoffs don’t 
have much improvement. The coefficients of improvement under total cooperation 
vary a lot from buyers to buyers, while total cooperation with Pareto constraint 
and group cooperation have restricted that variation. In other words, the two later 
schemes are more equitable for all players.  
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The coefficient of variation measures the stability of the algorithm. It is 
clear that the coefficients of variation under total cooperation scheme without 
Pareto constraint are high for most players, which means this scheme is unstable 
for most of them. Two other cooperation schemes assure good stability with 
variations in payoff of less than 5% for all players. 
 
8.2 Stochastic situation 
8.2.1 Test on IEEE 14 bus system 
We implement the evolutionary algorithm for finding optimal coalition structure 
on IEEE 14 bus network. Firstly, the parameter a in the characteristic function 
(17) is set to zero, which means there are no transaction cost for grouping and no 





Figure 8.6: Evolution of coalition structure (case without group size effect) 
 
The best coalition structure value of 27605.30$ was achieved after about 
120 generations. The number of coalition decreases over generations, and 
ultimately there is only one coalition – the grand coalition. This is an expected 
result. In fact, when the parameter a is set to zero, the characteristic function is 
supperadditive and the optimal coalition structure is the grand coalition, as noted 
in part B - Section II.  
We run a second simulation where parameter a is set to 0.05. In this case, 
there exist transaction costs when forming a group and the group size causes 
certain negative effect on the coalition value. This simulation tests the capability 
of the proposed algorithm when dealing with non-supperadditive characteristic 
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function. The results are plotted in Figure 8.7. 
 
 
Figure 8.7: Evolution of coalition structure (case with group size effect) 
 
The evolutionary algorithm reaches the optimal coalition structure value of 
26269.78$ after nearly 200 generations. Due to the negative effect of group size, 
the optimal coalition structure is lower compared to previous case. Moreover, 
since the characteristic function is no longer supperadditive, the grand coalition 
was not formed, but 3 different coalitions.  The members of 3 coalitions and their 




Table 8.2: Distribution of optimal coalition structure 
 
 Buyer members 
(bus) 
 











Fluctuation indices 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13   













Fluctuation indices 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.31 0.31 0.49 0.55 












Fluctuation indices 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.29 0.52  
 
 
Since the characteristic function is based on a measure of risk in payoff, 
buyers on the same bus with low fluctuation indices prefer to form coalition. In 
fact, buyers 1, 2, 3 (bus 2) who have lowest fluctuation indices all join one 
coalition (coalition 2); the same strategy is observed with buyers 4, 5 (bus 4) and 
13, 14, 15 (bus 10). With group size effect, grouping decision has to take into 
account the number of members to join the coalition; therefore those with stable 
payoffs are the first to form coalitions. Other buyers with high fluctuation indices 
have to distribute themselves in existing coalitions so that they can also hedge 
against the risk making use of the payoff stability of their group mates.   
After partitioning the buyers into coalitions, we apply Shapley distribution 
within each coalition.  The Shapley values of buyers in three different situations 
are plotted in Figure 8.8. When there is no coalition formation among buyer, the 
Shapley value of a buyer is simply the Value at Risk of its payoff. Two other 
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situations of coalition with or without group size limit were discussed above.  
 
 
Figure 8.8: Shapley values for different coalition structures 
 
From the plot, we see that coalition helps to increase the Shapley value 
compared to the case of playing individually. That means buyers can better hedge 
against risk by forming coalition. The ideal grand coalition results in highest 
Shapley values, while Shapley values decrease because of restriction in group 
size. 
 
8.2.2 Test on IEEE 30 bus system 
To check to efficiency of the proposed method, simulation was performed on 
IEEE 30 bus system. In this implementation, there are 6 generators and 90 buyers 
in total. The buyers are equally distributed on 30 buses so that on each bus there 





Figure 8.9: IEEE 30 bus test system 
 
A market database was also built using random bids from buyer agents. As in the 
previous test on IEEE 14 bus system, it is observed that the fluctuation indices 
highly effect the formation of coalitions. Since all buyers in a same bus have very 
close fluctuation indices, we define the fluctuation index of a bus as the average of 
the fluctuation indices of the buyers on that bus. High attention is reserved for the 
buses where buyers cooperate to form coalition; therefore we make a distinction 
between those buses and other buses where buyers have to distribute themselves 
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in different existing coalitions. The fluctuation indices of 30 buses of the system, 
coupled with the proposed distinction are reported in Figure 8.10. 
 
 
Figure 8.10: Fluctiation indices of different buses in the test system 
 
It is clear that on buses with low fluctuation indices, buyers tend to 
cooperate to form coalition by themselves because they already have the 
advantage of stability in payoffs. On the other hand, buyers on buses with high 
fluctuation indices need to cooperate with buyers in other more stable buses to 
hedge against this fluctuation. Therefore a highly unstable bus doesn’t become a 
coalition, while a stable bus likely does. 
 
8.3 Summary of result analysis 
The proposed power market model has been simulated through deterministic and 
stochastic situation. The results show various aspects on the bidding and 
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cooperation strategies of electricity buyers. 
When buyers bid individually, their payoffs fluctuate around certain 
average values and the co-evolution progress doesn’t lead to a stable state due to 
the strong competition among them for highest possible payoffs. The market is 
driven to some “dynamic equilibrium”.  
On the other hand, total cooperation happens when all buyers cooperate to 
maximize the total profit. As expected, cooperation helps to increase the total 
profit; however, some buyers may not fairly enjoy the advantage of cooperation 
since their payoffs decrease. This fact suggests an improved scheme of 
cooperation which allows redistribution of payoffs and itself acceptable and 
equitable for all players: total cooperation with Pareto improvement. 
Since the profits of buyers on the same bus are highly correlated (these 
buyers have common LMP and share a number of network technical parameters), 
it is suggested that they should form a group. This cooperation helps to increase 
the total profit of a group, but similarly to the first simulation of total cooperation 
without Pareto constraint, the profit of some members could be worse off. 
Therefore, certain method for redistribution of dispatchable power could be used. 
In the stochastic situation where buyers cooperate to hedge against the risk 
of unstable payoffs, coalition helps to increase the Shapley value compared to the 
case of playing individually. It is noted that when the characteristic function is 
supperadditive, the optimal coalition structure is the grand coalition. The ideal 
grand coalition results in highest Shapley values, while Shapley values decrease 
because of restriction in group size.  The implicit factor that drives the cooperation 
progress is the fluctuation indices: Buyers on the same bus with low fluctuation 
indices prefer to form coalition, while other buyers with high fluctuation indices 
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have to distribute themselves in existing coalitions so that they can also hedge 






























In deregulated power markets, consumers are given more choices through flexible 
bidding and cooperation strategies, but they have to consider the transmission 
network and its physical limitations. Therefore, active demand side participation 
in the market is both a reasonable requirement and an economic necessity for 
greater efficiency. In this research, bidding and cooperation strategies of buyers in 
a deregulated electricity market have been studied through designing different 




In order to fully develop the electricity market, this research proposes and 
evaluates a single-node model and a multi-node model. It was found from the 
simulations of the single-node model that a competitive market can lead to 
equilibrium, which has been shown to be a Nash equilibrium. We also found that 
cooperation helps to increase the profit of most buyers. The strategy used in 
cooperation is to limit the quantity bids and thus get lower MCP. However, 
inefficient buyers have a risk of being limited in bidding large quantities and get 
low profits. The free rider problem when one buyer plays individually against the 
cooperation of others was also investigated. The free rider doesn’t have to limit 
his quantity bids, but still enjoys the low MCP thanks to the cooperation of others 
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and thus benefits the most. This result can lead to a situation similar to the 
prisoner dilemma, where all buyers hope to be a free rider and play individually.  
The multi-node model was then developed by taking into account the 
physical limitations of the system. Moreover, besides the payoff, another 
estimation of buyers’ performance was proposed to capture the risks while trading 
in a very volatile environment like electricity market. In this multi-node model, all 
physical and technical constraints of the network were taken into account by using 
an IEEE 14 bus test system and an Optimal Power Flow solver. The first finding is 
that players should not bid marginally but strategically, since the Local Marginal 
Price depends heavily on the physical location. 
In the deterministic situation, we also found that cooperation helps to 
increase the profit of most buyers, while individual bidding introduces a 
competitive environment and prevents the market from getting to an equilibrium 
state. Moreover, total cooperation with Pareto constraint can assure an 
improvement in profits for all buyers and make it somehow more equitable and 
globally acceptable. In reality, total cooperation is difficult to achieved, therefore 
group cooperation was investigated, where buyers formed groups and bid 
strategically to maximize the profit of the group. Similarly to the total cooperation 
case, it has been shown that a payoff redistribution in group cooperation is 
necessary. The performance and stability of different cooperation schemes have 
also been analyzed and verified statistically.   
Stochastic situation was modeled by building a database that represents the 
historical data of buyers in the market. The theoretical base of the approach was 
studied in the framework of an optimal coalition structure problem. In this study, 
we assume that buyers cooperate to hedge against the risk in low payoffs. Both 
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mathematical and simulation results show that when there are no limitation of 
coalition size, the grand coalition is optimal. It is then shown that when there are 
limitations of coalition size, such as the transaction cost in practice, different 
coalitions will be formed. The partitioning way of buyers in coalitions was also 
discovered: Buyers in the same bus with stable payoffs tend to form coalition by 
themselves, while buyers with highly fluctuating payoffs have to join existing 
coalitions to make use of the stability of others.  The efficiency and applicability 
of the proposed evolutionary algorithm were verified by an additional test on a 
much larger system of 30 buses and 90 buyers. 
 
To summarize, we list down the main contributions of this research: 
• The proposed agent based co-evolutionary framework has been 
demonstrated to be especially suitable for modeling market participants. In 
fact, the restructured electricity market with its large number of 
participants is spread over wide geographical areas, and the interactions 
and coordination of independent participants have been effectively 
simulated using this approach.  
• The simulation results have successfully illustrated common observations 
in bidding and cooperation strategies of electricity buyers. The 
practicability of the proposed methodology is also verified by successfully 
dealing with large number of buyers. 
• We proved an important theorem that serves as a link between the 
problems of payoff distribution in cooperative game theory and optimal 
coalition generation in combinatorial optimization theory. The main 
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advantage of the approach is that this methodology is general and any 
characteristic function can be applied. 
• This study would be helpful for electric power buyers in finding attractive 
cooperative strategies, while assuring certain payoff stability in a volatile 
trading environment. For power market operators and policy makers, our 
findings give a deeper and more dynamic view into the deregulated 
electricity market. 
 
9.2 Suggestions for future work 
In this study, cooperative buyers are assumed to have unconditional trust among 
them, which does not fully reflect the real world situation. Therefore, conditional 
trust should be modeled, where cooperative buyers may have the possibility to 
turn their backs on their groups in order to gain greater benefits. As such, 
modeling conditional and fuzzy trust is one possible area for further research and 
development. 
Another suggestion for future research is to consider different characteristic 
functions in the Cooperative Game model. As we have seen, a characteristic 
function models the rationale and motivation for cooperation, which can vary 
through different market situations.  Therefore, considering different 
characteristics function may help to discover implicit reasons and mechanism of 
cooperation. 
Thirdly, we have introduced the problem of Optimal Coalition Structure 
Generation as a tool for studying cooperation between buyers. In future research, 
more effort should be spent to develop an efficient algorithm to solve the above 
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problem. Optimal Coalition Structure Generation is an important and difficult 
combinatorial optimization problem that has close relation with multi-agent 
systems. Therefore, we strongly believe that an agent-based evolutionary 
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This section helps us understand and distinguish the artificial evolution and 
artificial co-evolution. Two main models of co-evolution are cooperative and 
competitive co-evolution although many variations can be used. Many researchers 
have used these co-evolutionary optimization models in which the evaluation of 
fitness of an individual is subjective i.e. it depends on the relations with other 
individuals. It is reported that such models give higher values of fitness and 
require a lower computational cost than the classical evolutionary models. 
A.1 Evolutionary algorithms 
Many optimization problems broad areas of research have no direct “analytical 
solutions”. The idea of Evolutionary Algorithms is simply to build a random 
population of potential solutions to the problem. The “individuals” are then 
evaluated to encourage the reproduction of the fittest individuals, i.e. those who 
are closest to the optimal solution. The mechanisms of selection, recombination of 
most adapted individuals and mutation permit to gradually approach the desired 
solution.  
Evolutionary Algorithms have common core mechanism: it consists of 
making a population evolving by random transformation of some of its elements 
and application of the natural selection principle. Several techniques have been 
elaborated. The main ones are as follows: 
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- Genetic Algorithms: they are probably the best known algorithms in 
evolutionary computation. They were developed in the 60s to study the complex 
adaption process of natural species. 
- Evolution Strategies were developed to solve numerical optimization problems 
in the space of real parameters 
- Programming Evolutionary first appeared in the finite state automata space for 
the prediction of time-series.  
- Genetic Programming is to evolve structures of trees representing programs. 
Although the applications of evolutionary algorithms are varied and they have 
given good results in different areas, the mathematical study of these algorithms is 
still very limited due to their theoretical complexity. It was until the 90s that 
complete and rigorous proofs of convergence in probability are 
established. Nevertheless, these theoretical results are difficult to use in practice. 
To optimize a given objective function F (also known as performance or 
fitness) defined over a search space E, a population of individuals (points of E) is 
subjected to a series of generations (the initial population is randomly chosen in 
E). A generation begins with the selection of the most adapted individuals 
(relative to F) for reproduction. These individuals generate offspring using 
stochastic operators called crossover for binary operators, and mutations for unary 
operators (applying to a single individual). Finally, some of the descendants 
replace some of the parents to complete the process of generation. The selection 
and replacement paradigms which represent the Darwinian rule of survival of the 
fittest may be stochastic or determinist. As in natural evolution, it is hoped to 
observe the gradual emergence of more and more adapted individuals: the best 
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individuals in the final population should be close to solutions of the optimization 
problem.  
The representation space that we actually study (where the evolution 
operators operate, also called the genotypes space) is often different from space in 
which the fitness is calculated (phenotypes space). To move from phenotypes 
space to genotypes space, an additional modelling or coding step is necessary. 
 
Figure A.1: Operation of Evolutionary Algorithms 
 
 The stopping criterion can take several forms: for example, the maximum number 
of evaluations or satisfaction in the objective value of the best individual. If the 
individuals of a population are too similar, the following next generations may 
become more and more homogeneous. In this case, the evolution of a population 
may be summarized in the evolution of a single dominant individual, thus less 
exploration the search space. To perform an efficient search, we have to maintain 
a balance between the exploitation of good solutions found so far and the 
exploration of unknown areas of the search space. Excessive exploitation can lead 
to stagnation in a local optimum (premature convergence) while as an excessive 
exploration could lead to an almost random search (no convergence). 
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A.2 Representation of an individual 
The representation or coding of an individual has to include fundamental 
characteristics of the problem. It must also be easily to be manipulated by 
recombination and mutation operators, allow easy transformation on the search 
space and generate feasible solutions. A good coding is as follow: 
- Facilitate the development and application of variation operators (recombination, 
mutation) to adequately cover the space of individuals; 
- Be simple in its construction and consistent with the addressed problem  
- Provide simple and effective transition to the search space (and vice versa). 
A.2.1 Binary representation 
By analogy with the natural genetics, evolutionary algorithms use bits by tradition 
to represent the chromosomes. Indeed, biological genes are encoded by nucleotide 
sequences built from four varieties: adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C) and 
thymine (T). Biological genes allow the synthesis of amino acid sequences, i.e. 
proteins in charge of the phenotype of an individual. For an optimization problem 
on n integer variables Xi , we can represent each of these variables by a binary 
string of ki bits and we obtain the chromosome of size ∑ ..	  
The first results on convergence were established on such sequences of 
bits, and showed that the coding of chromosomes with genes whose alphabet has 
low cardinal was theoretically more efficient. Binary encoding also gives 
Evolutionary Algorithms good robustness because it is independent from the 
domain of the problem and standard operators can be used systematically. 
However, this type of coding has some drawbacks: 
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- Two elements close in search space does not necessarily decode two 
neighbouring individuals in terms of Hamming distance (the number of different 
bits). We can avoid this problem by using Gray coding [31] which maintains a 
Hamming distance of “1” between two consecutive individual voters.  
- Additionally, for problems requiring high precision, the binary encoding can 
quickly become inadequate. 
A.2.2 Real valued presentation 
The principle of this representation is to directly encode the variables of the 
problem in the individual without using the binary coding means. Thus, the 
individuals are no longer strings of bits bit but real vectors. One major advantage 
of this representation is to keep variables of the problem in the coding itself, thus 
allowing it to take better account of the structure of the problem. This direct 
representation using real parameters requires defining new specific operators. 
A.3 Initialization of the population 
In general, the N individual population P(0) = {X1,. . . XN} is initialized through 
uniform drawing from the search space E while ensuring that all individuals meet 
the constraints. Moreover, if we have priori information about a region where the 
optimal solution is likely located, it is obvious to manually add good solutions into 
the initial population, while ensuring a sufficient diversity of population. The 
initial population can also be the result of a previous evolution. 
A.4 Artificial Darwinism and evolution engine 
The Darwinian part of Evolutionary Algorithm consists of two steps: the 
reproduction step where parents are selected to recombine and the replacement 
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step which replaces the worse individuals by better ones. 
The selection is an essential operator whose principle is to allow the best 
individuals of a population to reproduce. The adjustment of this mechanism 
is critical in the performance of the Evolutionary Algorithm: an excess 
of selection leads to a loss of diversity and results in unreachable areas 
in the search space, and an insufficient selection can lead random walk, thus no 
convergence. We can find in literature a large number of selection strategies that 
are more or less adapted to the problem they address. We present here the most 
popular selection procedures [31]. 
A.4.1 Proportional selection 
There are two popular proportional selection methods: Roulette wheel selection 
and stochastic universal sampling. 
 The Roulette wheel selection represents each individual of the population 
P(t) = {X1,. . . , XN} on a contiguous segments of a line such that the individual’s 
segment is proportional to their fitness. A random number is generated and the 
individual whose segment spans the random number is selected. We repeat the 
process until the desired number of individuals is obtained. This method is similar 
to a roulette wheel with each slice size proportional to the fitness. The expected 




                                               
This method of selection favours the best individuals, but the bad ones also have 
chance of being selected. However, the cost of execution is high and the minimum 
spread (minimum range of possible values for the number of offspring of an 
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individual) is not guaranteed. Moreover, the loss of diversity is possible because 
the copies produced only from the best individuals can represent the whole the 
next population. 
Stochastic universal sampling bases on roulette wheel selection, except 
that a deterministic aspect is added. Here we place equally spaced pointers over 
the line; the number of pointers is the number of individuals to be selected. Let M 
be this number, then the distance between the pointers are 1/M and the position of 
the first pointer is given by a randomly generated number in the range [0, 1/M]. 
The interest of this selection method is that it reduces the spread. 
A.4.2 Tournament selection 
The tournament selection also uses comparisons between individuals, and does 
not even require sorting the fitness of the population. The results depend on the 
size T of the tournament. To select an individual, we draw T individual uniformly 
in the population, and we select the best of them. Over a generation ago, the 
number of individuals to be selected is the number of tournaments. This method is 
characterized by a selection pressure that is in general stronger than the 
proportional method (for a less adapted individual to be selected, it is necessary 
that its tournament opponents are even worse). Moreover, this method is the 
cheapest in terms of execution cost and the selection pressure is easily 
configurable by the value of T. However, it does not guarantee minimum spread. 
A.4.3 Reinsertion 
Various reinsertion strategies can be used, the principle is to replace the old 
population by new, after applying recombination and mutation. In standard 
genetic algorithms, the children simply replace the parent 
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population. Nevertheless, there exist alternative strategies: 
- Replacing a percentage of the parents by the best children;  
-The systematic replacement of the worst individual; 
-The random replacement (while maintaining a coherent research strategy). 
The goal is to increase the speed of convergence of simple Genetic Algorithm, but 
reinsertion can still produce a premature convergence towards local optima. 
Another technique is deterministic replacement, widely used in evolution 
strategies (ES). The purely deterministic characteristic plays a key role in 
evolution as it guides the search towards areas with better individuals. Two 
distinct versions were introduced:  
- The scheme (µ, λ)-ES: µ denotes the number of parents in the population that 
generates    λ > µ new individuals (by recombination and mutation). The 
reinsertion takes place by selecting the µ best individuals among λ children and 
replacing µ parents with µ chosen children.  
- The scheme (µ + λ)-ES: This scheme looks at the best µ individuals from the 
union of µ parents and λ children.  
The (µ + λ) scheme is called elitism and it guarantees a monotonic improvement 
of the fitness of best individual through generations, but it fits poorly with a 
possible change of environment. On the other hand, with the (µ, λ) scheme we 
may lose the best individual, but the algorithm is more flexible in dynamic 
optimization where the environment changes. It should be noted that elitism is 
often used. This mechanism keeps the best individuals (often only the best one) of 
the population in generation t for the next population in generation t +1 if there 
are no better children. 
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A.5 Variation operators 
Variation operators aim to generate new individuals from those previously 
selected. We distinguish between recombination and mutation. 
A.5.1 Recombination 
The principle is analogous to biological reproduction: The children inherit the 
qualities from their parents. Recombination is usually called crossover for binary 
representation. The standard form of the recombination operator is  c: E × E → E 
× E (E is the search space), that recombines two parents P1, P2 with a certain 
probability pc (0 ≤ pc ≤ 1). Other forms of recombination are available such as 
when one child is produced by more than two parents. Among different types of 
recombination, there are: 
- Binary crossover: 
This is an operator on E × E → E × E, with E = {0, 1}.  It corresponds to an 
exchange of genes (bits) between the two parents. There are three most popular 
variants: single point crossover, multi-point crossover and uniform crossover. 
Single point crossover is the simplest and the most classical recombination 
technique of Genetic Algorithms. It randomly selects a breakpoint in each of the 
two parents P1 and P2, and builds two offspring by exchanging their genes on both 
sides of this point. 
 
Figure A.2: Single-point crossover 
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Choosing a single cross point biases the effect of crossover: if the chosen point is 
close to one end of the chromosome, the children will be almost identical to the 
parents. On the other hand, if the chosen point in the middle, they will be 
very different from their parents. 
Multi-point crossover avoids the problem above by considering the 
chromosome as circular rather than linear, and by choosing k breakpoints. Figure 
A.3 shows an example of multi-point crossover with k = 3. 
 
Figure A.3: Multi-point crossover 
Uniform crossover uses a randomly generated binary mask with the same size as 
the chromosomes to indicate which parent will provide the gene at each locus. 
Other crossover operators exist, they can either make modifications to those 
presented above, or be specific to a class of problems, but nevertheless they obey 
to a common principle: the exchange of information between individuals. 
- Real valued recombination 
The standard real valued recombination is very close to the crossover described 
for binary coding in the previous section. It differs from binary crossover only by 
the nature of the genes altered. Bits are no longer exchanged, but the actual 
values. The real valued representation allows us to develop a new mating type 
which is called arithmetic recombination, mainly based on linear combination of 
two individuals that are now real vectors. It consists of choosing two genes P1(i) 
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and P2(i) in each parent at the same position i, and define the corresponding genes 
E1(i) and E2(i) of the children using linear combination: 
E1(i) = α P1(i) + (1 - α) P2(i)          (3.2) 
E2(i) = (1 - α) P1(i) + α P2(i)                      (3.3) 
Where α is a uniform random variable belonging to the interval [0, 1]. It is also 
possible to generate individuals outside the segment joining the two parents by 
choosing the parameter α in [-d, 1 + d], with caution to stay within the bounds of 
the problem domain. 
 
Figure A.4: Possible area of the offspring after intermediate recombination 
 
A.5.2 Mutation 
The general idea of mutation is to introduce variability in the population. This 
operator modifies one or more genes of the selected individual with a certain 
probability pm (0 ≤ pm ≤1). Mutation ensures ergodicity property (the capacity to 
cover the whole search space) for the Evolutionary Algorithms and the 
reintroduction of lost diversity. 
- Binary Mutation  
Binary mutation is a random modification of the gene values that happens with a 
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fixed probability pm by individual. The most frequently used binary mutations are:  
- Single-bit mutation chooses randomly a position in the chromosome and changes 
the value of the corresponding bit. 
- c/l – mutation changes the bit value of each position independently with 
probability c/l, where l is the length of the chromosome and c > 0. 
- Real valued mutation  
The principle of real valued mutation is generally to add a random Gaussian 
perturbation to the various components of the individual X: 
  Xi: = Xi + s.N (0, 1)            (3.4) 
where s is the standard deviation of the mutation and N (0, 1) is a random normal 
standard variable. 
The difficulty of this approach is the adjustment of the standard deviation 
s. Indeed, if the standard deviation is too small, the movement in the search space 
is insufficient, thus the algorithm can be stuck near to a local optimum and cannot 
visit new areas. On the other hand, if the standard deviation is high, the algorithm 
can reach to the region containing the optimum, but the convergence quality will 
not be good. Thus at the beginning of the evolution, the standard deviation s 
should be high enough to quickly explore the search space, and ultimately become 
a lower for better exploration of solutions. 
A.6 Properties of Evolutionary Algorithms: 
At each step of the Evolutionary Algorithm, we must make a trade-off between 
exploring the search space to avoid getting stuck in local optima and exploiting 
the best individuals obtained in order to achieve better solutions. Exploration in 
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Evolutionary Algorithms is done with mutation and exploitation is done with the 
selection and recombination. We can therefore adjust exploration and exploitation 
through various algorithm parameters.  
The term genetic diversity indicates the variety of genotypes in the 
population. It is a key feature of Evolutionary Algorithms. Genetic diversity 
becomes zero when all individuals are identical, and when diversity is very low, 
there is very little chance that it increases again. If the loss of diversity occurs too 
early, the convergence takes place to a local optimum. 
The advantage of Evolutionary Algorithms is to that they can be applicable 
to wide classes of problems: multi nodal, convex or non-convex problems.... 
Moreover, they are able to work on any space research: continuous, discrete, or 
mixed-space...  However, the success and search execution time depend heavily 
on the representation (genotype space) and variation operators (recombination, 
mutation) selected. Also, the choice of the fitness function is a crucial point since 
the algorithm requires a large number of evaluations of the objective function.  
The computation time required to obtain significant results on real 
problems leads to the use of other techniques such as parallelization: Distribution 
of calculation on a set of synchronous or asynchronous processors, using island 
and distributed population models. 
A.7 Towards Co-evolutionary Algorithms 
As mentioned before, in ecology a living individual is not only influenced by its 
own environment but also by other individuals in the environment as well as other 
processes as changes in climate or geographical structure. The notion of mutual 




A.7.1 Definition of Co-evolution 
In classical evolutionary algorithm, each individual evolves independently, which 
is not the case in real ecosystems. In an ecosystem, the fitness of an individual is 
defined according to its interactions with other individuals. Co-evolution arises 
because of interactions between different species. In a co-evolutionary system, the 
evolution of a species must be considered simultaneously, because the 
evolutionary adaptation of a species can force the adaptation of others. In other 
word, the actions of each species affect all other species in the same physical 
environment. 
Co-evolution has many advantages that can renew the evolutionary 
performance of system. It is based on the principle that when a population 
becomes superior to the other, the later has to amplify the selection pressure and 
evolve more quickly to survive. The class of Co-evolutionary Algorithms is an 
extension of classical Evolutionary Algorithms to solve problems that are 
potentially complex, with too large search space or problems without an objective 
function such as strategy games. Co-evolutionary Algorithms are based on the 
principle of subjective function, where the fitness of an individual becomes 
estimation for other individuals interacting with it [32]. 
In co-evolutionary algorithms, individuals are evaluated based on their 
interactions with others. The nature of these interactions depends on the problem 
to be solved. In many problems, the individuals or populations compete with one 
another. This is called competitive co-evolution, which is widely applied in game 
playing strategies. On the other hand, an individual is rewarded when contribute 
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well in cooperation with other individuals in cooperative co-evolution. 
A.7.2 Interaction and selection of collaborators 
The mechanism in which a participant determines its collaborators or competitors 
is among the most important factors for a successful application of algorithms co 
evolutionary. The most obvious (and computationally expensive) method to 
evaluate an individual is to let it interact with all potential collaborators or 
competitors, this sometimes called pair-wise or complete interaction. 
Alternatively, collaborators / competitor can be selected by a variety of ways: 
uniformly random methods or methods based on fitness. 
A.8 Properties of Co-evolutionary Algorithms 
The scope of Co-evolutionary Algorithms is extremely broad. It can approach 
problems with large search space, or having no intrinsic objective function or with 
complex structure. To obtain better results, it is therefore reasonable to divide a 
large search into sub-spaces. It is also more efficient to divide a complex structure 
into simple structures that co-evolve.  
Co-evolutionary Algorithms are more difficult to control compared to 
classical Evolutionary Algorithms. The reasons often stem from the complicated 
internal dynamics of co-evolutionary systems. Sometimes, this can lead to a 
system behaving in an incomprehensible manner, and whose progress is difficult 
to diagnose. 
 
